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Introduction 
Anthrax is a zoonotic disease caused by the spore-forming 
bacterium Bacillus anthracis (1,2). The disease most commonly 
occurs in wild and domestic mammals (e.g., cattle, sheep, goats, 
camels, antelope, and other herbivores) (3). Anthrax occurs in 
humans when they are exposed to infected animals or tissue 
from infected animals or when they are directly exposed to 
B. anthracis spores (4–6). Depending on the route of exposure, 
anthrax can occur in three forms: cutaneous, gastrointestinal, 
or inhalation. 
Corresponding preparer: Jennifer Gordon Wright, DVM, CDC, 1600 
Clifton Road, NE; MS A-38; Atlanta, GA 30333. Telephone: 404-639-
4749; Fax: 404-639-2205; E-mail: jgwright@cdc.gov. The material in 
this report originated in the National Center for Immunization and 
Respiratory Diseases, Anne Schuchat, MD, Director.
Today, B. anthracis is considered one of the most serious bio-
warfare or bioterrorism agents because of the ability of the spores 
to persist in the environment,  the ability of the aerosolized spores 
to readily cause infection via respiratory (inhalation) exposure, 
and the high mortality of resulting inhalation anthrax (7–9). 
CDC has classified anthrax as a category A biological warfare 
agent (10), meaning it has great potential to adversely affect 
public health. The lethality of aerosolized B. anthracis spores 
was demonstrated in 1979 when an unintentional release of 
B. anthracis spores from a military microbiology facility in the 
former Soviet Union resulted in 64 deaths (11). The cases of 
anthrax that occurred after B. anthracis spores were distributed 
through the U.S. mail in 2001 further underscored the potential 
dangers of this organism as a bioterrorism threat (12–15). 
Vaccines against anthrax were first developed as early as 1880 
and used in livestock (16). An acellular product for human 
use was developed in 1954 and used in the first U.S. efficacy 
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Summary 
These recommendations from the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) update the previous recommenda-
tions for anthrax vaccine adsorbed (AVA) (CDC. Use of anthrax vaccine in the United States: Recommendations of the Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP]. MMWR 2000;49:1–20; CDC. Use of anthrax vaccine in response to terrorism: 
supplemental recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP]. MMWR 2002;51:1024–6) and 
reflect the status of anthrax vaccine supplies in the United States. This statement 1) provides updated information on anthrax 
epidemiology; 2) summarizes the evidence regarding the effectiveness and efficacy, immunogenicity, and safety of AVA; 3) provides 
recommendations for pre-event and preexposure use of AVA; and 4) provides recommendations for postexposure use of AVA. In 
certain instances, recommendations that did not change were clarified. No new licensed anthrax vaccines are presented. 
Substantial changes to these recommendations include the following: 1) reducing the number of doses required to complete 
the pre-event and preexposure primary series from 6 doses to 5 doses, 2) recommending intramuscular rather than subcutaneous 
AVA administration for preexposure use, 3) recommending AVA as a component of postexposure prophylaxis in pregnant women 
exposed to aerosolized Bacillus anthracis spores, 4) providing guidance regarding preexposure vaccination of emergency and other 
responder organizations under the direction of an occupational health program, and 5) recommending 60 days of antimicrobial 
prophylaxis in conjunction with 3 doses of AVA for optimal protection of previously unvaccinated persons after exposure to aero-
solized B. anthracis spores. 
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study of human anthrax vaccine (17). This product was later 
modified, resulting in anthrax vaccine adsorbed (AVA) (18), the 
vaccine currently approved for use in the United States. AVA 
prepared using B. anthracis V770-NP1-R was first licensed in 
the United States in 1972 as a 6-dose, subcutaneously (SC) 
administered priming series with annual boosters for persons 
in occupations placing them at risk for exposure. AVA also is 
available as a component of a postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) 
regimen under an Investigational New Drug (IND) protocol 
(19) and may be made available under an Emergency Use 
Authorization (EUA) (20–22). 
Methods
In 2000 and 2002, CDC provided recommendations 
from the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices 
(ACIP) for the use of anthrax vaccine for prevention and as 
a component of PEP (23,24). Because of 1) new safety and 
immunogenicity data for AVA, 2) a pending licensure change 
for AVA, 3) the need to incorporate anthrax vaccine recom-
mendations into one document, and 4) new epidemiology 
data, the ACIP Anthrax Vaccine Work Group convened for 
the first time for an in-person meeting in October 2007. 
The work group consisted of 35 members representing the 
Department of Defense (DoD), the American College of 
Occupational and Environmental Medicine, the InterAgency 
Board for Equipment Standardization and Interoperability, 
the Office of the Biomedical Advanced Research and 
Development Authority, the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH), the American Veterinary Medical Association, the 
American Academy of Pediatrics, the American College of 
Obstetrics and Gynecology, the National Association of 
County and City Health Officials, and the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA). The work group subsequently held 12 
conference calls over 11 months to review and discuss both 
published and unpublished scientific data related to AVA. 
Relevant literature was identified through consultations with 
expert partners and other researchers. These data included 
safety evaluations, immunogenicity studies, efficacy analyses, 
vaccine supply information, and contemporary experience 
with the use of AVA both as a preexposure vaccine and as a 
component of PEP. Work group members developed recom-
mendation options during their calls. When scientific evidence 
was lacking, recommendations incorporated expert opinions 
of the work group members. 
In December 2008, FDA approved a dose reduction and 
route change for AVA administration (25) following submis-
sion of a biologics license application (BLA) (26) supplement 
that was originally submitted in June 2005 by Emergent 
BioSolutions (Rockville, Maryland). This approval was based 
on data from the CDC-sponsored Anthrax Vaccine Research 
Program (AVRP) phase 4 clinical trial (referred to as the AVRP 
clinical trial in this report). 
During the ACIP meeting in February 2008, presentations 
were made on anthrax epidemiology and transmission, published 
AVA safety and efficacy data, and unpublished data from the 
AVRP clinical trial. In June 2008, draft recommendations were 
presented to ACIP. During the October 2008 meeting, revised 
recommendations, with the exception of the dose reduction and 
route change, were presented to ACIP for a vote. In February 
2009, ACIP recommended a new, 5-dose pre-event and preex-
posure priming series administered intramuscularly (IM) (27). 
Background
B. anthracis is a facultatively anaerobic, gram-positive, encap-
sulated, spore-forming, nonmotile rod. The infectious form of 
B. anthracis that is predominantly found in the environment 
is the spore, which is approximately 1 µm × 2 µm; anthrax is 
contracted from these spores, which are highly resistant to heat, 
cold, drought, UV light, and gamma radiation. B. anthracis 
has three major virulence factors: an antiphagocytic capsule 
and two exotoxins, referred to as lethal toxin and edema toxin. 
These toxins are responsible for the primary clinical manifesta-
tions of hemorrhage, edema, necrosis, and death. 
Disease is categorized according to the route of human 
exposure to B. anthracis spores: cutaneous, gastrointestinal, 
or inhalation. The precise infectious dose of B. anthracis in 
humans by the various routes is not known; inhalation anthrax 
can develop in susceptible hosts after exposure to a relatively 
small number of spores (28,29). Based on data from studies 
of nonhuman primates, the lethal dose has been estimated to 
range from 2,500 to 760,000 spores (11,30). The majority of 
human anthrax cases worldwide are naturally occurring (i.e., 
not a result of bioterrorism). The case-fatality rate for anthrax 
ranges from <1% (for cutaneous anthrax treated with appro-
priate antimicrobial agents) to 86%–89% (during the 1979 
outbreak in the former Soviet Union and in the United States 
during the 20th century, respectively) (6,11,31,32). 
naturally occurring Anthrax
Throughout much of the 20th century, anthrax in humans 
was grouped into two categories: agricultural or industrial 
(6,33). B. anthracis spores can remain viable and infective in 
soil for decades, during which time they serve as a potential 
source of infection for grazing livestock that might become 
infected when they ingest or inhale the spores. B. anthracis 
spores in soil generally do not pose a direct infection risk 
for humans, who are typically infected by B. anthracis spores 
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through contact with contaminated animal products or an 
infected animal (28). Agricultural cases of anthrax occur among 
persons who have direct contact with infected sick or dying 
animals or who handle infected carcasses or tissues. Persons at 
risk for acquiring anthrax through agricultural exposure might 
include ranchers, veterinarians, slaughterhouse or abattoir 
workers, and butchers. 
Industrial cases of anthrax result from the cutaneous inocu-
lation or inhalation of particles containing B. anthracis spores 
generated during the cleaning and industrial processing of con-
taminated hides, hair, or wool from infected animals. Workers 
in wool and mohair processing facilities were historically at 
risk for contracting both inhalation and cutaneous anthrax, 
which made the disease a substantial health hazard in the wool 
industry in the 19th century and throughout the first half of 
the 20th century (4,34). Industrial processing of animal hair or 
hides accounted for 153 (65%) of 236 anthrax cases reported 
to CDC during 1955–1999 (35); commercial products made 
from animal hair or hides accounted for an additional five (2%) 
cases. Of these 158 cases, the majority (94%) were cutaneous 
anthrax; 10 (6%) cases were inhalation anthrax. 
Naturally occurring anthrax cases also have occurred outside 
of agricultural and industrial settings as a result of contact 
with products from anthrax-infected animals. Such products 
include anthrax-contaminated bristle shaving brushes, animal 
skins, animal hair or yarn, and bone meal (31,36–41). During 
2006–2008, three inhalation cases (in the United Kingdom, 
United States, and Scotland) and two cutaneous cases (in the 
United States) were associated with drums made from imported 
contaminated hides (36,39,42–44).
Estimating the worldwide incidence of naturally occurring 
human anthrax is difficult because reporting of anthrax cases 
is unreliable in many settings (28). However, anthrax is most 
commonly observed in agricultural regions with inadequate 
control programs for anthrax in livestock. Anthrax outbreaks 
affecting domestic animals in these regions lead to direct or 
indirect human infection. Enzootic and endemic regions 
include South America, Central America, southern and east-
ern Europe, Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Middle East 
(28). The largest recent epidemic of human anthrax occurred 
in Zimbabwe during 1978–1980 and involved 9,445 cases, 
including 141 (1.5%) deaths (5). The incidence of anthrax in 
animals in the United States has decreased since the middle of 
the 20th century, from 25 states reporting animal outbreaks in 
1951 to eight states reporting outbreaks for the 10-year period 
from 1997 to 2006 (45,46) Outbreaks among both domestic 
animals and wildlife continue to be reported from the Great 
Plains states from Texas to North Dakota and in western states, 
including California, Montana, Nevada, and New Mexico (45). 
Cases that occur sporadically in both domestic livestock and 
free-ranging wildlife might not be recognized. 
Anthrax is a nationally notifiable disease (information avail-
able at http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/nndsshis.htm). 
In the 21st century, naturally occurring cases of anthrax in the 
United States have occurred sporadically, with two or fewer 
cases reported each year. Of the 242 naturally occurring human 
anthrax cases reported to CDC during 1955–2007, 232 (96%) 
were cutaneous, 10 (4%) were inhalation, and none were 
gastrointestinal (CDC, unpublished data, 2010). The only 
reported case of gastrointestinal anthrax in the United States 
occurred in 1941 (47) and resulted from an industrial expo-
sure, not from contaminated food. Although gastrointestinal 
exposure to anthrax has been documented in the United States, 
no confirmed cases of anthrax resulted from the exposures 
(48). In 2010, CDC received a report of a woman with severe 
gastrointestinal symptoms after exposure to B. anthracis spores 
(CDC, unpublished data, 2010). 
Bioterrorism-Related Anthrax
In 2001, 22 confirmed or suspected human cases of anthrax 
occurred in the eastern United States (referred to as the bioter-
rorism events of 2001 in this report) when B. anthracis spores 
were sent through the mail in powder-containing envelopes 
to news media companies and U.S. congressional leaders 
(14,15,49). Eleven of the 22 cases were inhalation anthrax, and 
11 were cutaneous; 20 of the cases occurred in mail handlers 
or persons exposed to buildings where contaminated mail 
was processed or received (15). Five persons with inhalation 
anthrax died. The source of exposure was unknown in two of 
the fatal cases (50,51); however, cross-contaminated mail was 
considered a possible source. 
B. anthracis has been a focus of offensive and defensive 
biological warfare research programs worldwide (10). Anthrax 
was used against livestock and draft animals as a bioweapon 
by Germany during World War I; during World War II, Japan 
conducted weapon field trials with anthrax in Manchuria. 
Numerous countries, including the United States, the United 
Kingdom, the former Soviet Union, and Iraq, conducted 
anthrax weapons research at various times during World War 
II, the Cold War, and the decades that followed (52,53). In 
1979, at least 96 persons were infected and 64 persons died 
during an anthrax outbreak in the Soviet city of Sverdlosk after 
anthrax was unintentionally released from a military microbio-
logic facility believed to be a biowarfare facility (11). In 1993, 
a religious cult, Aum Shinrikyo, unsuccessfully attempted to 
use B. anthracis as a weapon near Tokyo, Japan (54). 
In 2008, the Department of Homeland Security issued a 
statement indicating that anthrax poses a threat sufficient to 
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affect U.S. national security (55). WHO experts have estimated 
that 50 kg of B. anthracis spores released upwind of a popula-
tion center of 500,000 persons could result in 95,000 deaths 
and 125,000 hospitalizations (56), and a release of 100 kg 
of spores upwind of the Washington, DC, metropolitan area 
would result in an estimated 130,000 to 3 million deaths 
(57). An intentionally dispersed strain of B. anthracis might 
have different characteristics from a naturally occurring strain. 
Intentionally dispersed strains might demonstrate antimicro-
bial resistance or increased dispersion capabilities. Primary 
aerosolization (dispersion of particles in air resulting from the 
initial release) and secondary aerosolization (resulting from 
agitation of the settled particles from the primary release) are 
important considerations in bioterrorist acts (58–64). The 
magnitude of risk for inhalation anthrax from secondary 
aerosolization of B. anthracis spores is uncertain. 
The bioterrorism events of 2001 prompted extensive biode-
fense research, as well as the creation and implementation of 
bioterrorism preparedness plans. Since 2001, in addition to 
increasing the number of public health mechanisms by which 
drugs and vaccines are distributed and dispensed or administered 
(i.e., EUA), emergency response and preparedness measures have 
focused on improving the effectiveness and timeliness of distrib-
uting and dispensing antimicrobials and vaccine for PEP. 
Efforts also have been made to improve the availability and 
timely distribution and administration of AVA in postevent 
settings. Because AVA is not licensed for postexposure use, 
the vaccine may be made available under an IND protocol or 
possibly under an EUA in an emergency (19–22). 
Pathogenesis and Disease
B. anthracis enters the host in the form of spores (65) at the 
epidermis (cutaneous anthrax), the gastrointestinal epithelium 
(gastrointestinal anthrax), or the lung mucosa (inhalation 
anthrax). It is unknown whether B. anthracis has an active 
invasive process, and the symptoms and incubation period vary 
depending on the route of exposure to the spores. In general, 
symptoms of any form of anthrax usually begin within 7 days 
of exposure (1). Most naturally occurring B. anthracis bacteria 
are sensitive to a wide range of antimicrobial agents. Before 
initiating antimicrobial treatment, appropriate specimens 
should be obtained for isolation of the organism by culture. 
In practice, B. anthracis is readily identifiable using a range of 
standard microbiological tests, including Gram stain, cell and 
colony morphology, sensitivity of the gamma phage of McCloy, 
and production of the γ-linked poly-d-glutamic acid (γDGA) 
capsule in blood or under culture in 20% carbon dioxide.
Most cutaneous and gastrointestinal infections occur at the 
site of preexisting lesions (66). Inhalation anthrax occurs after 
inhalation of aerosolized particles containing viable B. anthracis 
spores and their deposition at the alveolar epithelial surface 
(6,66). Inhalation anthrax is not pneumonia; in this form of 
disease, the mediastinal lymph nodes are usually the nidus of 
bacterial proliferation. Spores also can germinate at the pulmo-
nary epithelial surface, and lung tissue might be infected as a 
consequence of fulminant systemic bacterial proliferation from 
other portals of entry (67). Regardless of the route of exposure, 
vegetative B. anthracis can spread through the blood stream, 
causing systemic disease (i.e., systemic anthrax) that results in 
hypotensive shock and sudden death (65). Systemic anthrax 
is typically fatal unless diagnosed and treated promptly (11). 
Anthrax meningitis can occur secondary to any of the three 
forms of anthrax. Although meningitis can occur without any 
other clinical signs and symptoms of anthrax, the condition is 
most often associated with inhalation anthrax. 
The pathogenicity and proliferation of B. anthracis in the host 
are primarily a result of the combined actions of the γDGA 
capsule and the two protein exotoxins, edema toxin (a complex 
composed of protective antigen [PA] and edema factor) and 
lethal toxin (a complex of PA and lethal factor) (68). Production 
of the capsule and toxins parallels the germination and out-
growth of B. anthracis spores (69). The capsule is considered to 
be antiphagocytotic, and the exotoxins disarm the innate and 
acquired immune responses (70–72). Edema toxin increases 
host intracellular cyclic adenosine monophospate (cAMP) 
levels, resulting in cytokine modulation, upregulation of the 
anthrax toxin receptor, and disruption of interstitial fluid bal-
ance (73,74). Lethal toxin inactivates members of the mitogen-
activated protein kinase kinase (MAPKK) family, causing an 
imbalance in the production or release of a range of cytokines 
(75,76). In cases of cutaneous anthrax and those in which the 
nidus of infection remains localized, the combined effects of 
the toxins are tissue edema and local tissue necrosis. In cases of 
systemic anthrax secondary to any form of initial disease, the tox-
ins cause hemorrhagic tissue and organ necrosis, hypoxic insult, 
and edema. In cases of inhalation anthrax, the edema is most 
prominent in the pleura, whereas in gastrointestinal anthrax, the 
fluid accumulation is most prominent as ascites (77,78).
Cutaneous Anthrax
More than 95% of all naturally occurring B. anthracis infections 
worldwide are cutaneous. This form of anthrax is associated with 
handling infected animals or contaminated items such as meat, 
wool, hides, leather, or hair products from infected animals (79). 
Cutaneous anthrax has characteristic signs and symptoms and 
is recognizable if the physician is familiar with the disease. The 
majority of cutaneous anthrax lesions develop in exposed areas 
such as the face, neck, arms, and hands. The lesion begins as a 
small, often pruritic papule that quickly enlarges and develops 
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a central vesicle or bulla, which ruptures or erodes, leaving an 
underlying necrotic ulcer. A characteristic firmly adherent, black 
eschar develops over the surface of the ulcer. The lesion is usu-
ally painless. Satellite vesicles and ulcers might also form (80). 
Edematous swelling of the surrounding tissues occurs, often with 
regional lymphadenopathy and lymphangitis. Systemic signs 
and symptoms, including fever, malaise, and headache, might 
accompany the cutaneous lesion (1). Historically, case-fatality 
rates for cutaneous anthrax have been as high as 20% without 
appropriate treatment but <1% with appropriate antimicrobial 
therapy (6). Because the progression of the disease is mediated by 
toxins, the lesions progress through the various stages once they 
have appeared, even with antimicrobial therapy. Discharge from 
cutaneous lesions might be infectious; however, the risk for person-
to-person transmission of cutaneous anthrax is very low (81). 
Differential diagnoses for a blackened eschar or other lesion 
include staphylococcal or streptococcal cellulitis or lymphadeni-
tis, eczema, and herpes simplex or varicella zoster. In addition, 
depending on the epidemiologic history or route of exposure, 
parapoxvirus infection (orf virus and pseudocowpox virus) should 
be considered, because they are the most common parapoxviruses 
in U.S. food animals such as cattle, sheep, and goats. The differ-
ential diagnoses also include brown recluse spider bite, rickettsial 
pox, ecthyma gangrenosum, ulceroglandular tularemia, plague, 
typhus, glanders, erysipelas, cat-scratch disease, rat-bite fever, 
aspergillosis, mucormycosis, vaccinia, cutaneous leishmaniasis, 
cutaneous tuberculosis, and leprosy (80,82). 
The incubation period for cutaneous disease is reported to be 5–7 
days (range: 1–12 days) (83). However, during the 1979 Sverdlovsk 
outbreak, cutaneous cases reportedly developed up to 13 days after 
the aerosol release of spores (11), and an outbreak in Algeria was 
reported with a median incubation period of 19 days (84).
Gastrointestinal Anthrax
Gastrointestinal anthrax typically occurs after eating raw or 
undercooked contaminated meat, although spores consumed 
through any route, including spores that are inhaled and sub-
sequently swallowed, can result in gastrointestinal anthrax. In 
the United States, no cases of gastrointestinal anthrax have been 
reported since 1941 (47). Although gastrointestinal anthrax 
could occur as a result of bioterrorist activity, no bioterrorism-
associated cases have been reported. Gastrointestinal anthrax 
can occur in two forms: 1) intestinal or abdominal or 2) 
oropharyngeal. Data from human cases and outbreaks are lim-
ited, although clinical disease likely ranges from asymptomatic 
to fatal (85). The primary site of infection is the gastrointestinal 
epithelium. Infection might be associated with preexisting 
lesions in the alimentary tract, which might play a role in the 
development of oropharyngeal lesions. However, studies in 
mice demonstrated infection in the Peyer patches of the small 
intestine after intragastric deposition of spores (67). 
The intestinal form develops when spores infect the gastro-
intestinal tract epithelium after consumption of undercooked, 
contaminated meat. Signs and symptoms range from subclinical 
gastrointestinal disturbances to clinical illness with nausea and 
vomiting, fever, anorexia, and abdominal pain and tenderness and 
can progress to hematemesis and bloody diarrhea. Abdominal 
distension with voluminous, hemorrhagic ascites might be 
present (85,86). The disease might progress to septicemia and 
toxemia, cyanosis, shock, and death (86–88). Extensive edema 
of infected intestinal segments and mesentery can develop, and 
lesions might become necrotic and ulcerated. Infection of the 
mesenteric lymph nodes accompanied by lymphadenopathy 
might develop (86). An eschar might develop on the wall of the 
terminal ileum or cecum (86,89), and the upper gastrointestinal 
tract is occasionally affected (85,90–92). 
The oropharyngeal form occurs after infection of the oropha-
ryngeal epithelium and is characterized by lesions at the base of the 
tongue or tonsils, with sore throat, dysphagia, fever, and regional 
lymphadenopathy. Edematous lesions develop, which progress 
to necrotic ulcers covered with a pseudomembrane. Edema and 
swelling develop in the oropharynx and neck, accompanied by 
cervical lymphadenopathy, pharyngitis, and fever (85,88). 
The differential diagnoses of hemorrhagic gastroenteritis or 
oropharyngeal lesions suspected to be gastrointestinal anthrax 
should include the following (28): food poisoning, acute appen-
dicitis, ruptured viscus, diverticulitis, dysentery, parapharyngeal 
abscess, malignancy, hemorrhagic gastroenteritis from other 
infectious causes, necrotizing clostridial enteritis, streptococ-
cal pharyngitis, Vincent angina, Ludwig angina, and diseases 
causing acute cervical lymphadenitis, acute gastritis, or acute 
abdomen. Organisms may be isolated from vomitus or feces, 
from swabs of oropharyngeal lesions, or from blood or ascites 
fluid (79,88). The incubation period for gastrointestinal disease 
is estimated to be 1–6 days; the case-fatality ratio is unknown 
but is estimated to range from 25% to 60% (1,88). 
Inhalation Anthrax
Inhalation anthrax is a systemic infection caused by inhalation 
of B. anthracis spores. The mediastinal lymph nodes are most 
often the nidus of bacterial proliferation. Inhalation anthrax has 
historically accounted for 5% of all anthrax cases in the United 
States (31). This form of the disease results from the inhalation 
of aerosolized B. anthracis spore-containing particles that are 
≤5 microns (66). Spore-containing aerosols can be generated 
through industrial processing or work with spore-contaminated 
animal products such as wool, hair, or hides; by laboratory 
procedures such as vortexing of cultures; or as a result of the 
intentional release of aerosolized spores. Inhaled spores lodge 
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in the alveolar recesses and can become dormant, remaining 
dormant for weeks to months They are subsequently taken up 
by alveolar macrophages and then germinate (93–95), leading 
to substantial variability in the incubation period. 
Early studies of inhalation anthrax demonstrated that inhaled 
spores are phagocytosed by macrophages in the lungs and trans-
ported to the pulmonary-associated lymph nodes, where ger-
mination and vegetative growth occur, followed by bacteremia 
and dissemination to the rest of the body (94–96). Once taken 
up by alveolar macrophages, some spores are transported to the 
pulmonary-associated lymph nodes, where they continue to 
germinate, multiply, and release toxins (69,97–100), resulting 
in hemorrhagic necrosis of the thoracic lymph nodes that drain 
the lungs, or a hemorrhagic mediastinitis. Animal models also 
have demonstrated rapid phagocytosis of B. anthracis spores by 
interstitial dendritic cells, followed by dendritic cell migration 
to the thoracic lymph nodes (100). Exposure to aerosolized 
spores also has resulted in infection of nasal-associated lym-
phoid tissues in <24 hours, followed by subsequent spread 
to mandibular lymph nodes (67). Necrotizing pneumonitis 
occasionally develops (12,101,102).
Initial signs and symptoms of inhalation anthrax are non-
specific and might include sore throat, mild fever, and muscle 
aches; these symptoms might initially be mistaken for an 
upper respiratory infection (79,103). Approximately 2–3 days 
later, infected patients generally become progressively ill as 
respiratory symptoms develop, including severe dyspnea and 
hypoxemia, and the disease progresses with development of 
hypotension, diaphoresis, worsening dyspnea, shock, cyanosis, 
and stridor (104). Chest radiography often reveals the charac-
teristic widened mediastinum (12,79). 
Antimicrobial agents are effective against germinating and 
vegetative B. anthracis, but dormant spores are refractory to 
antimicrobials. Studies in nonhuman primates receiving anti-
microbials suggest that inhaled B. anthracis spores can persist 
for up to 100 days in a dormant state at the alveolar surface 
epithelium (95). Inhalation anthrax has developed up to 58 days 
after experimental aerosol exposure in primates that received 
postexposure antimicrobial prophylaxis for the first 30 days after 
aerosol exposure (93). Reported incubation periods for inhala-
tion anthrax in humans range from 1 to 43 days (11,31).
Disease development can be prevented as long as the admin-
istered antimicrobial agent is maintained at levels sufficient to 
kill germinating B. anthracis organisms while dormant spores 
are cleared from the host. Cessation of antimicrobial treatment 
before clearance of the spores might allow residual spores to ger-
minate and cause infection; therefore, the onset of inhalation 
anthrax might appear to be delayed (11,93,95,102,105,106). 
This late germination has not been observed in persons who 
have had a cutaneous or gastrointestinal exposure. 
Studies in animals suggest that incubation periods might 
decrease when the inoculum quantity increases (95,107,108). 
Similarly, in one reported human case, in a patient aged 
51 years who was a previously healthy office worker in a textile 
mill (31), epidemiologic and exposure data suggested that the 
incubation period was as short as 1 day. The textile mill pro-
cessed imported goat hair and previously had reported workers 
with cutaneous anthrax; however, no inhalation cases had been 
reported. The affected office worker had rarely entered the mill 
but developed inhalation anthrax in 1961, 1 day after visiting 
a dusty carding room in the mill. Subsequent investigation 
determined that both the goat hair being processed and the mill 
itself were widely contaminated with B. anthracis. In the 1979 
Sverdlosk outbreak of inhalation anthrax, cases were reported 
2–43 days after the initial release (11). Although the exact date 
of exposure in the Sverdlosk outbreak was not confirmed, the 
modal incubation period was reported as 9–10 days (11,65), 
which is slightly longer than the estimated incubation periods 
of 2–6 days in the few reported outbreaks of inhalation anthrax 
(11,106). The Sverdlosk data are limited regarding use of anti-
microbials and vaccine; the number of people who received 
an intervention and the effectiveness of the intervention are 
unknown. Therefore, estimations of the incubation period 
during this outbreak are difficult to calculate (109). During 
the U.S. bioterrorism events of 2001, the median incubation 
period for six of the first 10 cases was 4 days (range: 4–6 days) 
(12). A review of all the 2001 inhalation cases indicates that 
the estimated incubation period was 4.5 days (15), a period 
consistent with previous reports (1). 
Case-fatality ratios of 86% and 89% were reported after 
the 1979 Sverdlosk outbreak in the former Soviet Union and 
in the United States during in the 20th century, respectively 
(11,31,32). During the bioterrorism events of 2001, the case-
fatality ratio for patients with inhalation anthrax treated in 
intensive care units was 45% (five of 11 cases) (15).
Bacteremic Dissemination and Meningitis
After infection at the primary cutaneous, gastrointestinal, 
or inhalation site, lymphatic and hematogenous proliferation 
of anthrax bacilli can result in dissemination to other organs 
and organ systems (i.e., systemic anthrax). Massive septicemia 
with 107 to 108 bacteria per milliliter of blood and toxemia can 
develop, systemic effects including high fever and shock develop 
quickly, and death usually follows rapidly (65). Laboratory 
animal and nonhuman primate model studies demonstrate 
hematogenous spread to abdominal organs and the central 
nervous system (107,110–112) with systemic inflammation, 
increased vascular permeability, and disseminated intravascular 
coagulation (113). Autopsy findings among decedents of the 
1979 Sverdlosk outbreak and the bioterrorism events of 2001 
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included hepatic congestion, congestive necrosis of the spleen, 
and submucosal gastrointestinal lesions (101,114).
Anthrax meningitis has been reported with all three clini-
cal forms of anthrax and likely results from hematogenous 
spread across the blood-brain barrier, generally presenting as 
hemorrhagic meningitis. Anthrax meningitis is characterized 
by a fulminant, rapidly progressive clinical course; even with 
aggressive therapy, cases are usually fatal (115,116). The likeli-
hood of the development of clinical or subclinical meningitis 
in patients with severe systemic B. anthracis infections is high. 
In rare cases, anthrax meningitis has been reported without any 
other associated primary (i.e., cutaneous, gastrointestinal, or 
inhalation) manifestation of anthrax (115,116). A review of 82 
cases of inhalation anthrax that occurred during 1900–2005 
included 70 fatal cases. Among the 70 patients who died, 11 
of 61 patients for whom data were available had signs of men-
ingeal involvement, compared with none of 12 patients who 
survived; 44 of the 70 patients who died developed menin-
goencephalitis during the course of their disease, compared 
with none of the 12 patients who survived. Development of 
meningoencephalitis during the course of disease was found 
to be significantly associated with death (p = 0.003) (104). 
Studies in nonhuman primates have demonstrated meningeal 
involvement in 33%–77% of experimental inhalation anthrax 
cases (93,108,110,112). 
Control and Prevention 
Human anthrax is best controlled through prevention, includ-
ing preexposure vaccination for persons at high risk for encoun-
tering aerosolized B. anthracis spores, reduction of animal illness 
by vaccination of livestock at risk for anthrax, and environmental 
controls to decrease exposure to contaminated animal products, 
such as imported hair and skins. After a person is exposed to 
aerosolized B. anthracis spores, a combination of antimicrobials 
and vaccine provides the best available protection.
Reduction of Risk for Exposure 
The incidence of naturally occurring human anthrax in the 
United States is greatly reduced through vaccinating and pre-
venting infection in livestock, improving industrial hygiene, 
and decreasing the use of contaminated raw imported materi-
als. Effective animal disease control programs have reduced the 
incidence of animal anthrax, and therefore human anthrax, 
worldwide. Since the initiation of annual vaccination of live-
stock in endemic regions in 1957, naturally occurring human 
cases in the United States have decreased from 38 cases in 1956 
to fewer than two cases annually during 1980–2008. Anthrax 
in livestock can be controlled through vaccination programs, 
rapid detection and reporting of cases, and proper disposal of 
dead animals with suspected or confirmed anthrax, preferably 
by incineration (28,45). In countries where anthrax is com-
mon and vaccination coverage among livestock is low, humans 
should avoid contact with livestock and products from animals 
that have not been inspected and found to be healthy before 
and after slaughter (1,3). In addition, consumption of meat 
from animals that experienced sudden, unexplained death or 
meat of uncertain origin should be avoided (1,5). Restrictions 
on the importation of hides and wools from countries in which 
anthrax is enzootic can reduce the number of U.S. cases.* 
Methods for sterilizing or inactivating spores on contami-
nated materials include steam sterilization or ethylene oxide 
gas sterilization, boiling or using dry heat, or treating with 
formaldehyde, glutaraldehyde, or hypochlorite for specified 
periods of time and exposure concentrations; air drying does 
not destroy B. anthracis spores (28,117–119). Industrial 
exposure and infection have been controlled through improve-
ments in industry hygiene standards, mechanization of animal 
processing, and strict importation guidelines. Although these 
improvements have reduced the risk among employees work-
ing with animals and animal products, the risk has not been 
completely eliminated (120,121). Precautions to minimize 
exposure when working with potentially contaminated animal 
hides have been published (36,43) and should be followed. 
Vaccination 
Vaccine Development
The first effective anthrax vaccines using live, attenuated 
cultures of B. anthracis were demonstrated in 1880 by William 
S. Greenfield and in 1881 by Louis Pasteur (16,122). Pasteur’s 
vaccine required a primary inoculation of B. anthracis that 
had been incubated at 42º–43ºC for 15–20 days (type I vac-
cine) followed by a second inoculation (type II vaccine) of less 
attenuated B. anthracis that had been incubated at 42º–43ºC 
for 10–12 days. This duplex vaccine was used widely until 
approximately 1935, when the procedure was modified to 
exclude the type I vaccine and reduce the virulence of the type 
II vaccine by the addition of 1%–10% saponin. Although effec-
tive, the virulence of heat-attenuated vaccines varied. In 1939, 
Max Sterne developed a live, attenuated spore vaccine from 
an avirulent, noncapsulated variant of B. anthracis (123,124). 
The Sterne-type vaccines replaced the Pasteur heat-attenuated 
formulations as the veterinary vaccines of choice. The veteri-
nary vaccine that is currently used in the United States is based 
on the B. anthracis Sterne 34F2 strain and is produced using 
* Sanitary control of animal byproducts (except casings), and hay and straw, 
offered for entry into the United States, 9 C.F.R. Pt. 95.
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a deep culture technique at approximately 105 doses per liter. 
Receipt of a single dose provides the animal with effective 
immunity for at least 1 year; revaccination is recommended 
to ensure protection for >1 year (105).
The feasibility of using acellular vaccines against B. anthracis 
was first suggested by investigators who discovered that injec-
tions of sterilized edema fluid from anthrax lesions provided 
protection in laboratory animals (125,126). This discovery led 
to the exploration of the use of artificially cultivated B. anthracis 
filtrates as vaccines (127–131) and thereby to the human anthrax 
vaccines currently licensed and used in the United States and 
Europe. The first such U.S. product was developed in 1954 as 
a cell-free filtrate from an aerobic culture of the Vollum strain 
of B. anthracis, precipitated with aluminum potassium sulfate 
(alum), and evaluated for potency (132,133). This vaccine 
provided protection in monkeys, caused minimal reactivity 
and short-term adverse events in humans, and was used in the 
original efficacy study of human vaccination against anthrax 
in the United States (17). In the 1960s, the vaccine manufac-
turing process in the United States was modified, leading to 
changes in the B. anthracis strain used (from the Vollum strain 
to V770–NP1–R) and a switch to a microaerophilic culture 
method. These alterations optimized the production of a stable 
and immunogenic formulation of vaccine antigen and increased 
the production scale. Subsequently, the Michigan Department of 
Public Health (MDPH), under a contract with DoD, pursued 
premarket approval of the vaccine (128,134,135). 
The formulation for which MDPH sought premarket 
approval became AVA; the vaccine was licensed by NIH in 
1970 and reapproved for licensure by FDA in 1985 (136). The 
safety and immunogenicity of the three generations of anthrax 
vaccine have been evaluated, and the resulting data support the 
FDA licensure of AVA (135). AVA is now marketed as BioThrax 
(Emergent BioSolutions, Lansing, Michigan) and is licensed 
for use in persons aged 18–65 years who are at high risk for 
exposure. AVA is not licensed for use in children (i.e., persons 
aged <18 years) or pregnant women (137). 
AVA 
AVA is the only licensed human anthrax vaccine in the 
United States. AVA was originally licensed for SC administra-
tion as a series of 6 priming doses (0, 2, and 4 weeks and 6, 12, 
and 18 months) followed by annual booster doses. AVA is a 
sterile, milky-white suspension prepared from cell-free filtrates 
of microaerophilic cultures of a toxigenic, nonencapsulated 
strain of B. anthracis V770-NP1-R. The production cultures are 
grown in a chemically defined protein-free medium consisting 
of a mixture of amino acids, vitamins, inorganic salts, and sug-
ars. Each 0.5-mL dose contains proteins from the sterile filtrate 
culture fluid (released during the growth period), including the 
protein PA (83 kDa), and contains no dead or live bacteria. The 
final product is formulated to contain 1.2 mg/mL aluminum, 
added as aluminum hydroxide in 0.85% sodium chloride, and 
25 µg/mL benzethonium chloride and 100 µg/mL formalde-
hyde, added as preservatives (137). 
Route of Administration and Immunogenicity
Numerous studies have demonstrated the immunogenicity of 
AVA in humans and animals. However, a serologic correlate of 
protection has not been fully defined. Several studies have dem-
onstrated seroconversion (fourfold rise in anti-PA immunoglob-
ulin G [IgG] titers) rates of 85%–100% among adults receiving 
2 and 3 doses of SC or IM AVA (138–141), indicating a strong, 
long-lasting immune response to the vaccine. Additional data 
have demonstrated statistically significant increases in anti-PA 
IgG levels among those with a prolonged interval between the 
first and second doses of AVA when compared with persons 
receiving AVA as originally licensed (142). 
In December 2008, FDA approved a BLA supplement sub-
mitted by Emergent BioSolutions for use of AVA in a pre-event 
or preexposure setting. The current licensed schedule consists 
of 5 0.5-ml IM injections (at 0 and 4 weeks and 6, 12, and 
18 months) and 0.5-ml booster injections at 1-year intervals 
after the 18-month dose. Although ACIP now recommends 
5 doses of AVA administered IM for pre-event or preexposure 
prophylaxis, persons with medical contraindications to IM 
administration (e.g., persons with coagulation disorders) may 
continue to receive the vaccine by SC administration (25). 
However, when administering AVA as a component of PEP, 
the vaccine should only be administered with 3 doses by the 
SC route under an IND or EUA. 
A randomized study of 173 participants compared the first 3 
AVA doses of the originally licensed schedule (SC injections at 
0, 2, and 4 weeks) with alternate regimens (SC or IM injections 
at 0 and 4 weeks and SC or IM injections at 0 and 2 weeks). 
The antibody concentrations for the group that followed the 
originally licensed schedule were comparable to those from 
the groups receiving injections at 0–4 weeks. In addition, the 
groups that received AVA 4 weeks apart had peak anti-PA IgG 
concentrations that were approximately threefold higher than 
those for the groups that received AVA 2 weeks apart (143). This 
study suggested that increasing the interval between the first AVA 
doses might lead to an immune response comparable to that 
of the originally licensed schedule, with fewer doses required 
to achieve that response. However, the results of the study 
could not be used to support a change in the use of the vaccine 
because of the small sample size. In 2000, the U.S. Congress 
funded the CDC-sponsored AVRP clinical trial, a large, phase 
4, double-blind, randomized, placebo-controlled study to assess 
the immune response to a reduced-dose schedule and a change 
Vol. 59 / RR-6 Recommendations and Reports 9
in the route of administration from SC to IM (140). The AVRP 
clinical trial enrolled 1,564 civilian participants in five U.S. 
sites during May 2002–March 2004. Fifty-one percent of the 
participants were women, and 49% were men; ages ranged from 
18–61 years and were evenly distributed among study groups. 
Approximately 75% of participants were white, 15% were black, 
and 10% were categorized as other. Participants were randomly 
assigned one of the following six vaccination schedules, with 
vaccinations administered over 42 months: 1) the originally 
licensed schedule of 8 SC doses (4 doses for the reported interim 
analysis); 2) 8 IM doses (4 IM doses for the reported interim 
analysis); 3–5) 7, 5, or 4 IM doses (3 IM doses through month 
6, with the three groups combined into one group for purposes 
of the interim analysis); and 6) placebo (140). As of February 
2009, when ACIP voted on the revised recommendations, data 
were available for review through dose 4. 
In 2005, CDC submitted data to FDA from the interim 
analysis of the first 1,005 enrolled participants who, at the 
time of the analysis, had received 4 doses of AVA by the SC 
route or the IM route or 3 doses by the IM route. Emergent 
BioSolutions subsequently filed a supplemental BLA. The 
primary outcome measures of this analysis were noninferiority 
of the anti-PA IgG geometric mean concentration (GMC), the 
geometric mean titer (GMT), and the proportion of responders 
with a fourfold increase in titer at week 8 (4 weeks after the 
week 4 dose) and month 7 (4 weeks after the month 6 dose) 
(140). At week 8, antibody responses were significantly higher 
in women than men in the 4-IM and 3-IM groups but not in 
the 4-SC group. By month 7, no significant differences between 
men and women had been detected in any of the groups ana-
lyzed. Antibody levels also were significantly higher in whites 
compared with blacks at week 8 (p<0.05), but by month 7, 
they were equivalent. Serological noninferiority analyses of 
antibody responses (anti-PA IgG GMC) demonstrated the 
noninferiority of both the 3-IM regimen and the 4-IM regimen 
to the originally licensed schedule at month 7 (Figure). 
CDC is analyzing animal data and designing bridging stud-
ies to correlate nonhuman primate immune responses to AVA 
with survival from inhalation anthrax. Bridging of these data 
to human immune responses to AVA will provide additional 
information regarding immune correlates of protection against 
anthrax in nonhuman primates and serological markers of 
protection in vaccinated humans. 
Efficacy 
Evidence for the efficacy of AVA comes from several stud-
ies in animals (including in nonhuman primates) and from 
a controlled vaccine trial in humans (17), observational data 
in humans (135,136), and immunogenicity data for humans 
and other mammals (129,130,139,141,144). A recent review 
provided support for the efficacy of AVA for persons aged 
18–65 years (145); no data are available regarding the efficacy 
of anthrax vaccine for persons aged <18 years and >65 years.
The protective efficacy of the alum-precipitated vac-
cine (the original form of the PA filtrate vaccine) and AVA 
(adsorbed to aluminum hydroxide) has been demonstrated 
in several animal models using different routes of adminis-
tration (127–129,132,144,146–151). The Rhesus macaque 
(Macaca mulatta) is considered a suitable model of inhalation 
anthrax in humans (108,152), and AVA has been shown to 
be protective against an aerosol challenge in macaques using 
B. anthracis strains of high virulence (132,149,153–155).
Initial evidence for efficacy in humans came from the 
Brachman study, a placebo-controlled, single-blind, clinical 
trial among workers in four northeastern U.S. mills that pro-

























FIGURE. Scatter plot of levels of the anti–protective anti-
gen immunoglobulin G geometric mean concentration 
(anti-PA IgG GMC) among participants in the Anthrax Vaccine 
Research Program (AVRP) phase 4 clinical trial,* by vaccine 
regimen group† and week§
Source: Marano N, Plikaytis BD, Martin SW, et al. Effects of a reduced dose 
schedule and intramuscular administration of anthrax vaccine adsorbed 
on immunogenicity and safety at 7 months: a randomized trial. JAMA 
2008;300:1532–43.
* Interim analysis of the AVRP clinical trial. 
† CDC submitted data to the Food and Drug Administration from the interim 
analysis of the first 1,005 enrolled participants who, at the time of the 
analysis, had received 4 doses of anthrax vaccine adsorbed by the sub-
cataneous (SC) route (4-SC group) or the intramuscular (IM) route (4-IM 
group) or 3 doses by the IM route (3-IM group). 
§ Serological noninferiority analyses of antibody responses at week 8 and 
month 7 (week 30) were performed (i.e., responses to injections up to week 
4 and month 6 [week 26], respectively). GMCs were one of three primary 
serological end points. Analysis of variance models were constructed to 
analyze log-transformed antibody data. Models allowed for the longitudinal 
nature of the data and included adjustments for study site, age group, sex, 
race, and significant interactions. 
¶ 95% confidence intervals. 
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during 1955–1959 using the alum-precipitated vaccine, the 
precursor to the currently licensed AVA. A total of 1,249 work-
ers were included: 379 received the full series of anthrax vac-
cine, 414 received placebo, 116 received an incomplete series of 
injections (with either vaccine or placebo), and 340 received no 
treatment (observational group). Before vaccination, the yearly 
average number of human cutaneous and inhalation anthrax 
cases among employees in these mills was 1.2 cases per 100 
employees. During the study, 26 anthrax cases (five inhalation 
and 21 cutaneous) were reported from the four mills. All five 
inhalation cases (four of which were fatal) occurred in partici-
pants who had not received vaccine; two had received placebo, 
and three had been in the observational group. Twenty of the 
21 cutaneous cases occurred among participants who had not 
been fully vaccinated. Fifteen of the 21 had received placebo 
injections, three had received no injections (observational 
group), and three had received some doses of anthrax vaccine. 
Among the three cases that occurred in vaccinated persons, one 
occurred just before administration of the scheduled third dose, 
one occurred 13 months after completion of the scheduled 6 
doses (but before any booster doses were received), and one 
occurred just before receipt of the first booster dose. The effi-
cacy analysis in this study included all cases of anthrax, regard-
less of the route of exposure or manifestation of the disease, 
providing a combined efficacy of 92.5% based on person-time 
of occupational exposure (17). 
During 1962–1974, CDC collected surveillance data, indepen-
dently of the Brachman clinical study, on cases of anthrax in mill 
workers or persons living near mills in the United States (135,136). 
Vaccinated persons received either AVA or the earlier formulation 
used in the original 1950s clinical trial (17). No cases of inhalation 
anthrax were identified in any of the workers. Twenty-seven cases 
of cutaneous anthrax were identified by CDC, 24 of which were 
in unvaccinated persons. In vaccinated persons, one case occurred 
after receiving 1 dose of anthrax vaccine, and two cases occurred 
after receiving 2 doses of anthrax vaccine. No documented cases 
of anthrax were reported for persons who had received at least 3 of 
the recommended 6 doses of anthrax vaccine. A civilian advisory 
panel reviewed the CDC surveillance data and determined the 
vaccine to be effective (136).
In March 2002, a committee appointed by the Institute of 
Medicine (IOM) released a comprehensive review of the most 
current safety and efficacy data available for AVA (152). The 
committee found human efficacy data to be limited to the 
Brachman study (17) and the CDC surveillance data (135,136) 
but concluded that the combination of human data and animal 
data demonstrated that AVA effectively protects humans from 
anthrax, including inhalation anthrax (152). The committee 
also determined that the mechanism of action of AVA protects 
humans from various B. anthracis strains and that a naturally 
occurring or bioengineered strain probably could not overcome 
AVA and cause anthrax (152).
The duration of AVA protection in humans after the initial 
priming series is unknown. Persons are considered protected 
from anthrax for as long as they continue receiving AVA 
according to the licensed schedule. A 2002 study of military 
personnel who had received 1, 2, or 3 priming doses during the 
early 1990s, followed by 1 dose 18–24 months later, demon-
strated that 99.3% of participants had measurable anamnestic 
responses (143). Data from animal studies suggest that the 
duration of protection after 2 doses might be 1–2 years and 
that 3 IM doses of AVA provide significant levels of protec-
tion in rhesus macaques for up to 4 years (140,144,149,155). 
Persisting, detectable PA-specific memory B cells in the blood 
might be useful markers for duration of immunity because of 
their ability to proliferate and differentiate rapidly into anti-PA 
antibody–secreting plasma cells. In a study of patients with 
clinical anthrax, peak anti-PA IgG levels after infection cor-
related with the number of PA-specific memory B cells in cir-
culation up to at least 1 year after infection (156). Circulating 
PA-specific memory B cells also were detectable in AVA vaccine 
recipients. These data suggest that both survivors of inhalation 
anthrax and vaccine recipients develop long-term protective 
immunity to anthrax; quantitative analysis of PA-specific IgG 
B cell memory might be a useful predictor of the duration of 
protection against anthrax (156). 
Safety 
At least eight reviews (9,135,136,145,152,157–159) and 35 
other publications include evaluations of AVA safety.
Prelicensure Adverse Event Surveillance
Local Reactions. In prelicensure evaluations, 6,985 persons 
received 16,435 SC doses: 9,893 initial series doses and 6,542 
annual boosters (160). Severe local reactions (defined as edema 
or induration of >120 mm) occurred after 1% of vaccinations. 
Moderate local reactions (defined as edema and induration of 
30–120 mm) occurred after 3% of vaccinations. Mild local 
reactions (defined as erythema, edema, and induration of <30 
mm) occurred after 20% of vaccinations. In a study of the 
alum-precipitated precursor to AVA, moderate local reactions 
were documented in 4% of vaccine recipients and mild reac-
tions in 30% of recipients (17). 
Systemic Reactions. In prelicensure evaluations, systemic 
reactions (i.e., fever, chills, body aches, or nausea) occurred in 
<0.06% (in four of approximately 7,000) of vaccine recipients 
(160). In the study of the alum-precipitated precursor to AVA, 
systemic reactions occurred in 0.2% of vaccine recipients (17). 
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Postlicensure Adverse Event Surveillance 
During January 1, 1998–December 31, 2008, nearly 12.4 
million doses of AVA were distributed for DoD and domestic 
licensed use (AT Waytes, Emergent BioSolutions, personal 
communication, November 5, 2009); 8.4 million of these doses 
were administered to approximately 2.1 million military per-
sonnel during March 1, 1998–December 31, 2008 (P Garman, 
Military Vaccine Agency, personal communication, November 
5, 2009). Less than 1% of all AVA doses were distributed to 
nonmilitary sources (AT Waytes, Emergent BioSolutions, 
personal communication, November 5, 2009).
The Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) has 
been used extensively to monitor adverse events that occur after 
vaccination with AVA. VAERS (161–163), a U.S. national pas-
sive surveillance system for reporting adverse events that occur 
after administration of U.S. licensed vaccines, plays an important 
role in the identification of adverse events that warrant further 
investigation. Although VAERS data are useful for detecting 
rare adverse events and assessing reporting trends, they cannot 
be used to assess incidence rates or causality. Reports can be sub-
mitted voluntarily by anyone, including health-care providers, 
patients, manufacturers, or family members; therefore, reports 
might vary in quality and completeness, often lack detail, and 
might include inaccurate information. Because VAERS is a 
passive surveillance system, actual rates for adverse events can-
not be calculated because the number of doses administered is 
unknown. Underreporting is another important limitation, as 
is differential reporting (e.g., increased reporting rates for spe-
cific vaccines or specific adverse events), which often occurs for 
more serious and unexpected events, events occurring soon after 
vaccination, events surrounded by publicity, and reports related 
to litigation proceedings (163,164). Hypotheses generated by 
VAERS must be confirmed by epidemiological studies (163).
During January 1, 1998–December 31, 2008, VAERS 
received 6,015 nonduplicate reports from U.S. sources of 
adverse events after receipt of AVA, either alone or concurrently 
with other vaccines (CDC, unpublished data, 2010). Of these, 
600 (9.9%) were categorized as serious events (i.e., events 
resulting in death, hospitalization, or permanent disability) 
(165). Approximately 74% of all reported adverse events that 
occurred after administration of AVA were in persons aged <40 
years. Twenty-six percent occurred in women and 72% in men; 
sex was not specified in 2% of the reports. The majority (75%) 
received AVA alone, and 25% received the vaccine concurrently 
with other vaccines. Eighty three percent of AVA reports were 
documented as being administered or funded by the military 
(CDC, unpublished data, 2010).
Adverse events reported to VAERS are coded using terms from 
the Medical Dictionary for Regulatory Activities (MedDRA) (166). 
Approximately 800 different MedDRA terms were reported 
in conjunction with AVA during 1998–2008. The 10 most 
common adverse events that occurred after AVA administra-
tion (either alone or concurrently with other vaccines) were 
arthralgia (n = 1,036, 17.2%), headache (n = 981, 16.3%), 
pruritis (n = 878, 14.6%), pain (824, 13.7%), injection-site 
erythema (n = 753, 12.5%), fever (n = 655, 10.9%), erythema 
(626, 10.4%), pain at the injection site (613, 10.2%), rash (606, 
10.1%), and myalgia (583, 9.7%) (172). As of December 31, 
2008, VAERS had received 25 reports of death among AVA 
recipients. Causes of death included a spectrum of cardiovascular 
disorders, unintentional or intentional injuries, malignancies, 
and chronic illnesses (CDC, unpublished data, 2010). Death 
reports have been summarized elsewhere (27,167,168).
Reports to VAERS after AVA administration have been 
reviewed by several expert groups (157,158,167,168). In 2003, 
IOM (169) recommended that CDC partner with DoD to 
follow up on signals generated by reviews of VAERS and DoD 
data, using the DoD Defense Medical Surveillance System 
(DMSS), a relational surveillance database containing data 
from military recipients of AVA and other vaccines (170).
Short-Term Adverse Events. Data on the safety of AVA are 
only available for persons aged 18–65 years; no information 
is available on the safety of this vaccine in children or older 
adults (>65 years). Much of the published data comes from 
the routine DoD anthrax vaccination program. Several studies, 
including clinical trials and uncontrolled observational studies, 
have examined immediate or short-term adverse events (e.g., 
hours to days) that occurred after receipt of AVA (171–177). 
The majority of these events have been limited to local reac-
tions (e.g., erythema, swelling, pain or tenderness, itching, and 
nodules) or mild, self-limited systemic symptoms (e.g., fever, 
chills, myalgia, arthralgia, and malaise). After a comprehensive 
review, the IOM committee (152) found no evidence that 
AVA recipients had a higher risk than the general population 
for life-threatening or permanently disabling adverse events 
immediately after receiving AVA and that rates and types of 
immediate or short-term reactions were comparable to those 
for other vaccines regularly administered to adults (152). 
After the bioterrorism events of 2001, 1,727 persons par-
ticipated in the CDC Anthrax Vaccine and Antimicrobial 
Availability program and received either AVA and antimicro-
bials or only antimicrobials (178). Among the enrollees, 199 
participants opted to receive AVA and antimicrobials. Local and 
systemic adverse event profiles for AVA recipients compared with 
those for persons who received only antimicrobials indicated 
that a higher proportion of persons who received AVA reported 
adverse events than did persons who received only antimicrobi-
als. The most commonly reported adverse events among vac-
cine recipients were discomfort at the injection site (70.9%), 
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erythema (45.2%), induration (58.8%), and swelling (39.7%). 
Participants who received AVA by the SC route in the AVRP 
clinical trial reported warmth, tenderness, erythema, induration, 
and nodule development more frequently than participants who 
received AVA by the IM route. Although fatigue and headache 
were the most commonly reported systemic adverse events 
among clinical trial participants, they were reported by <11% of 
participants. Women reported significantly more injection-site 
and systemic adverse events than men (140).
Several reviews have noted that women report a higher 
proportion of certain adverse events after AVA than men 
(152,157,167,168); this phenomenon has been documented 
with other vaccines as well (179). A comprehensive review of 
VAERS AVA data in 2004 demonstrated that women were 3 
times more likely than men to have or report an adverse event. 
Women were not more likely to be hospitalized than men 
because of adverse events, although women accounted for a 
greater proportion of reported injection-site adverse events and 
moderate or extensive injection-site inflammation (157). A study 
of female AVRP clinical trial participants to assess the effect of 
progesterone levels on adverse events and immune response is 
ongoing; final data will be available in late 2010. 
Long-Term (Chronic) Adverse Events. DoD has published 
several studies of long-term health effects among vaccinated and 
unvaccinated military personnel (180–184). Additional studies 
have assessed the long-term health of vaccinated researchers and 
fertility parameters for vaccinated males (185,186). None of the 
studies found that the risk for adverse health effects or chronic 
diseases (e.g., cancer or infertility) was higher after anthrax vac-
cination. These studies of long-term health effects support the 
IOM finding (152) that no convincing evidence exists to indicate 
that the risk for developing long-term adverse health effects is 
higher among anthrax vaccine recipients. As with all vaccines, 
the possibility for rare adverse reactions does exist with AVA. 
The Vaccine Analytic Unit (VAU) (170), which was devel-
oped to implement the IOM recommendations (169), is a 
collaborative CDC and DoD project with FDA participation. 
Using data from DMSS, VAU can analyze vaccine safety data 
for all vaccines administered to active-duty and reserve service 
personnel. In a matched case-control study, VAU investigators 
found no significant associations between optic neuritis and 
previous receipt of AVA, smallpox, hepatitis B, or influenza 
vaccines (187). In addition, VAU found no association between 
concurrent receipt of multiple vaccinations and hospitalization 
risk among U.S. military personnel (188). Studies to address 
additional topics (e.g., Stevens Johnson syndrome/toxic epi-
dermal necrolysis, type 1 diabetes mellitus, atrial fibrillation, 
and diffuse connective tissue diseases) are ongoing. 
Effect of Route of Administration on Adverse 
Events 
A small randomized study on the effects of route of administra-
tion on adverse events found that systemic adverse events were 
uncommon and similar for IM and SC groups. All local reactions 
(i.e., tenderness, erythema, warmth, induration, and subcutane-
ous nodules) were significantly more common after SC injection 
than after IM injection. Women who received IM injections 4 
weeks apart reported fewer of certain local adverse events than did 
women who received SC injections 2 weeks apart (143).
The AVRP clinical trial demonstrated that the proportion of 
injection-site adverse events was lower in the group receiving 4 
IM injections than in the group receiving 4 SC injections, espe-
cially among women, who experienced a significant decrease 
in the occurrence of warmth, tenderness, itching, erythema, 
induration, edema, and nodules. In addition, the duration of 
injection-site adverse events in the 4-IM group was shorter 
than that experienced by the 4-SC group. Persons in the 4-IM 
group also experienced significantly fewer moderate and severe 
injection-site adverse events (7.0%) than persons in the 4-SC 
group (10.2%, p = 0.04). Analog pain scale scores used to assess 
pain immediately after injection were significantly lower in 
the 4-IM group compared with the 4-SC group (p<0.01). In 
all study groups, women were almost twice as likely as men to 
experience an injection-site adverse event (OR = 1.93, p<0.01); 
however, the absolute differences between women and men 
for warmth, itching, erythema, induration, and nodules were 
largest in the 4-SC group. Route of administration was not 
associated with the occurrence of systemic adverse events, and 
the differences between men and women in regards to systemic 
adverse events were generally consistent across all study groups 
(including the placebo group) (140). 
Effect of Vaccination on Pregnancy and 
Breastfeeding 
A paucity of data exists regarding the use of AVA during 
pregnancy; however, in general, the use of inactivated vaccines 
is considered safe during pregnancy (189–193). Some evidence 
indicates that nonspecific stimulation of the maternal immune 
system might decrease the risk for birth defects (194,195). 
Potential benefits gained from the use of AVA during pregnancy 
might outweigh the risk in certain situations. DoD policy is to 
exempt pregnant military women from anthrax vaccination; 
however, some women were inadvertently vaccinated with 
AVA while pregnant, as reported in a recent study that evalu-
ated approximately 115,000 live births to military women 
(196). The study suggested that infants born to women who 
received anthrax vaccine in their first trimester of pregnancy 
had slightly higher odds of experiencing birth defects than 
infants born to never-vaccinated women (OR = 1.20, 95% 
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confidence interval [CI] = 1.02–1.42) or to women vaccinated 
only after pregnancy (OR = 1.02, CI = 1.01–1.43). When 
infants born to women vaccinated during their first trimes-
ter were compared with infants born to women vaccinated 
outside the first trimester, no statistical association with birth 
defects was found (OR = 1.18, CI = 1.00–1.41). Of the 10 
specific defects assessed in this study, only atrial septal defect 
(ASD) demonstrated a significant increase among infants 
born to women vaccinated during the first trimester. These 
findings were limited, partly because the code for ASD (per 
the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, 
Clinical Modification [ICD-9-CM]) is the same as the code for 
patent foramen ovale, a common finding in preterm infants. 
When preterm infants with ASD as the only reported birth 
defect were excluded from analyses, the association between 
ASD and vaccination in the first trimester was no longer sta-
tistically significant. In addition, late recognition of pregnancy, 
a moderate risk factor for many birth defects, including ASD, 
might explain the number of women vaccinated during their 
first trimester. After review of these data and discussions with 
the authors of this study, ACIP concluded that AVA is safe to 
administer during pregnancy but recommended that pregnant 
women defer vaccination unless exposure to anthrax poses an 
immediate risk for disease (27). 
Another study of 385 women who had received at least 1 dose 
of AVA before becoming pregnant (197) found no evidence of 
miscarriage, infertility, or other reproductive problems among 
vaccinated women. In addition, the study did not support 
the hypothesis that AVA administration resulted in decreased 
pregnancy rates among those vaccinated before pregnancy. 
No data have been collected on the use of AVA among 
breastfeeding women. Therefore, whether anti-anthrax anti-
bodies are transferred through milk from mother to infant is 
unknown; however, data from similar vaccines indicate that 
this might occur (198). No biological reason suggests that 
breastfeeding women or breastfed children have an increased 
risk for adverse events after the mother receives anthrax vaccine. 
Administration of other inactivated vaccines during breastfeed-
ing is not medically contraindicated (199).
Vaccination of Children
AVA use in children has not been studied, and the vaccine is 
not licensed for use in this population. A 2004 review demon-
strated that children aged <18 months experienced more local 
erythema and induration after receipt of vaccines containing 
an aluminum hydroxide adjuvant than after receipt of nonad-
juvanted vaccines. Erythema and induration were not reported 
in children aged 10–18 years, although these older children 
experienced local pain lasting up to 14 days after administra-
tion of vaccines with aluminum hydroxide adjuvants (200). The 
concentration of aluminum per dose of AVA is similar to that in 
the diptheria/tetanus/pertussis (DTaP) vaccine and is less than 
that in the combined DTaP/polio/hepatitis B vaccine (201). 
Because AVA contains aluminum hydroxide, local adverse events 
are likely to be similar to those described in adults administered 
AVA and in children administered other vaccines with similar 
aluminum hydroxide concentrations; ACIP concluded that no 
evidence suggests that the risk for serious adverse events after 
receipt of anthrax vaccine is higher in children. The morbidity 
of inhalation anthrax should be considered when children have 
been exposed to aerosolized B. anthracis spores.
PEP for Previously Unvaccinated 
Persons 
Vaccination as a Component of PEP
Studies have demonstrated not only the persistence of spores 
in nonhuman primates up to 100 days after inhalation expo-
sure (95) but also the potential for long-term spore survival 
and development of inhalation anthrax after discontinuation 
of postexposure antimicrobial agents (93,95). Because disease 
can develop long after exposure to spores, animal studies have 
examined the use of postexposure vaccination in combination 
with antimicrobial agents. Although the precise correlation 
between the immune response to vaccination and protection 
against disease has not been completely defined, several studies 
(93,95,102) have documented that 2- and 3-dose schedules 
of vaccination, combined with antimicrobial therapy, prevent 
development of disease in animals. Although the point at 
which a person develops immunity against anthrax after the 
first vaccination is unknown, available data indicate that the 
antibody response to the vaccination administered at week 26 
(month 6) is characteristic of a strong anamnestic response, 
in turn indicating that the vaccine schedule of day 0, week 2, 
and week 4 effectively primes the immune system against PA. 
The available data on human responses to AVA indicate that 
use of the 3-dose SC regimen (with doses at 0, 2, and 4 weeks) 
for PEP results in rapid anti-PA antibody production at high 
levels (140,143) and is therefore an additional benefit to the 
approved antimicrobial therapies. Therefore, ACIP previously 
recommended that 3 doses of AVA (SC at day 0, week 2, and 
week 4) be administered in conjunction with antimicrobial 
therapy to previously unvaccinated persons who have been 
exposed to aerosolized B. anthracis spores (23,24). 
As described, the AVRP clinical trial (140) demonstrated that 
a vaccination schedule of doses administered at 0 and 4 weeks 
via the IM route elicited a lower antibody response at week 8 
than did a schedule of doses administered at weeks 0, 2, and 
4 via the SC or IM route (Figure). Because the clinical signifi-
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cance of the lower immune response to a schedule of doses 
administered at 0 and 4 weeks is not known, and sex-related 
differences in antibody levels exist, adherence to a schedule 
that produces rapid development of high antibody levels is 
particularly beneficial in a postexposure setting. Therefore, 
in June 2009, FDA recommended retaining the current PEP 
protocol (3-dose SC series administered at 0, 2, and 4 weeks 
in conjunction with antimicrobial therapy for a minimum of 
60 days) until additional data are available (J Clifford, FDA, 
personal communication, June 24, 2009). 
After natural, occupational, or bioterrorism-related expo-
sure to aerosolized B. anthracis spores, the combination 
of AVA and antimicrobials is more effective than use of 
antimicrobials only. Vaccination as a component of PEP is 
beneficial when antimicrobial PEP is discontinued too soon 
after exposure. Poor adherence to the prescribed regimen, 
which has been as low as 42%, minimizes the effectiveness of 
postexposure antimicrobial therapy (202). The bioterrorism 
events of 2001 also suggested that persons might be exposed 
to larger amounts of B. anthracis spores than those studied in 
animal models. A possible consequence would be prolonged 
spore clearance, with increased levels of residual spores at 
the alveolar surface epithelium and therefore an increased 
potential for infection when antimicrobial prophylaxis is 
discontinued after 60 days (202). 
Because of the potential for short incubation periods with 
inhalation anthrax, especially when the inhaled dose might be 
large, and the rapid progression and associated high morbidity 
and mortality, antimicrobial PEP should be initiated as soon 
as possible after inhalation exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis 
spores. Vaccination also should be initiated as quickly as pos-
sible but will likely occur several days after antimicrobial agent 
initiation for logistical reasons. To maximize the benefits of 
vaccine, the first dose should be initiated within 10 days of 
exposure. Antimicrobial use should continue until the immune 
response to the priming series has developed, which is expected 
to be 10–14 days after administration of the third dose of 
vaccine. PEP recommendations for inhalation exposure to 
aerosolized B. anthracis spores differ from those for a naturally 
occurring cutaneous or gastrointestinal exposure. 
Because AVA is not licensed for postexposure use, adminis-
tration of AVA as a component of PEP is available under an 
IND application (IND #10061, held by CDC) and may be 
made available under an EUA (19–22).† The PEP regimen 
included in the IND protocol includes children aged 0–17 
years. IND protocols require detailed records to be kept; writ-
ten, informed consent from all participants; data collection; 
reports to FDA; and follow-up of patients. The IND mecha-
nism is generally suited to clinical practice and is not easily 
used during an emergency. The Project BioShield Act of 2004 
authorizes the FDA commissioner to issue an EUA during an 
emergency under certain circumstances (21). Under an EUA, 
medical countermeasures to diagnose, treat, or prevent serious 
or life-threatening diseases for which no adequate, approved, 
and available product exists can be disseminated quickly for 
the protection and safety of the U.S. population. The issuance 
of an EUA enables large-scale use of a medical countermeasure 
(203) such as AVA as a component of PEP. AVA has been used 
extensively, including after the bioterrorism events of 2001, 
with a good safety profile; therefore, on the basis of a review 
of existing data and expert opinion, ACIP expects that future 
use of AVA as a component of PEP is likely to have a good 
safety profile.
Antimicrobial Agents as a Component of PEP
Because limited data are available, the optimal duration 
of antimicrobial therapy in combination PEP is uncertain. 
Antimicrobial therapy for 60 days, without vaccine, might 
prevent inhalation anthrax; however, antimicrobial agents 
without vaccine might not protect persons from late spore 
germination. Using the limited available data, FDA licensed a 
60-day course of antimicrobials for postexposure use; a shorter 
course (<60 days) of antimicrobial therapy, even when com-
bined with a 3-dose AVA series, is not approved for use by FDA. 
In 2006, an expert panel (204) discussed whether, based on 
the limited evidence (102,139), the duration of antimicrobial 
use could be shortened with concurrent receipt of AVA. The 
panel determined that the available data were too limited to 
support a regimen of <60 days. 
Oral ciprofloxacin, oral doxycycline, and parenteral (IM) 
penicillin G procaine have been shown to be effective for PEP 
use in a nonhuman primate model (93) and are FDA approved 
for a 60-day course for inhalation anthrax (postexposure) in 
all age groups (205,206). Ciprofloxacin and doxycycline are 
equivalent first-line antimicrobial agents for PEP, because they 
are equally effective and have similar susceptibility profiles 
among naturally occurring B. anthracis isolates (93,207). In 
addition, both have similar safety profiles, with a low rate of 
anaphylactic reactions (208,209). 
Selection of PEP agents should involve consideration of the 
potential for antimicrobial resistance. Both naturally occur-
ring constitutive and inducible β-lactamase production can 
be present in B. anthracis isolates (207,210–212). Because 
induction of resistance has been previously reported in the 
nonhuman primate model (213), there are concerns that 
an insufficient dosage could induce penicillin resistance in 
humans (49,214,215). For these reasons, oral penicillins are 
not considered first-line antimicrobial agents for PEP but may † Protection of Human Subjects, 21 C.F.R. Pt. 50.
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be considered after the antimicrobial susceptibility profile of 
the organism is known. B. anthracis is not susceptible to cepha-
losporins or trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole (207,216,217). 
Although oral amoxicillin is an alternative to the first-line 
PEP agents when antimicrobial susceptibility profiles demon-
strate appropriate sensitivity (minimum inhibitory concentra-
tion [MIC] ≤0.125 µg/mL), amoxicillin has not been studied 
for the prophylaxis or treatment of anthrax, and no safety or 
efficacy data are available for this indication. Amoxicillin is not 
FDA approved for use as a component of PEP and therefore 
should only be administered under an IND or possibly under 
an EUA to certain patient groups (e.g., children or pregnant 
or nursing women) during a declared emergency provided the 
criteria for issuance have been met.
Because oral amoxicillin has better pharmacokinetics than 
equivalent doses of oral penicillin V, oral amoxicillin may be 
used with a less frequent dosing interval, potentially improving 
adherence to therapy (218–222). Compared with oral penicillin, 
oral amoxicillin has greater pulmonary penetration and is able 
to maintain a higher concentration above MIC in the target 
tissues (e.g., pulmonary-associated lymph nodes, tissues, and 
secretions) for a greater portion of the dosing interval (223–227). 
Oral amoxicillin at dosages approved for other indications (i.e., 
500 mg/kg every 8 hours for adults; 45 mg/kg/day orally in 3 
divided doses for children weighing <40 kg) should prevent 
postexposure inhalation anthrax if the B. anthracis strain in 
question has an amoxicillin MIC <0.125 µg/mL (225–227). 
Amoxicillin-clavulinic acid combinations may be considered for 
PEP. Because potassium clavulanate does not have a significant 
impact on the pharmacokinetics of oral amoxicillin, the dosage 
is based on the amoxicillin component (228). 
Levofloxacin been shown to be effective for PEP use in a non-
human primate model (229) and is FDA approved for inhala-
tion anthrax (postexposure) in patients aged >6 months (230). 
Short-term (up to 28 days) safety data exist, but extended-use 
(up to 60 days) data are limited (231). Therefore, levofloxacin 
is recommended as a second-line PEP antimicrobial agent to 
be reserved for instances in which tolerance issues or drug 
resistance patterns indicate its use.
Dosing information for recommended antimicrobial agents 
for PEP is provided (Table 1). For patients unable to tolerate 
FDA-approved antimicrobial agents, clinicians may consider 
clindamycin, chloramphenicol, erythromycin, vancomycin, or 
other fluoroquinolones for PEP, based on in vitro susceptibility 
results. Administration of these agents would be considered 
off-label use (i.e., for other than the FDA-approved use) and 
might require an IND or EUA. 
Adverse Events Associated with Antimicrobial PEP
Adverse events associated with the long-term use of antimi-
crobial PEP include gastrointestinal upset and other conditions 
that are expected when normal body flora are disrupted by 
antimicrobial use (232). Any antimicrobial agent can have 
undesirable side effects, including allergic reactions. Patients 
should be urged to inform public health authorities and their 
health-care providers of any adverse events that occur. Long-
term fluoroquinolone use has been associated with tendinitis 
and tendon tears (233). 
During the bioterrorism events of 2001, approximately 10,000 
persons were recommended to receive a 60-day regimen of anti-
microbial prophylaxis (doxycycline, ciprofloxacin, or amoxicillin) 
for suspected or confirmed exposure to B. anthracis spores. Adverse 
events that were commonly reported by patients were not serious 
and included diarrhea, stomach pain, nausea, vomiting, headache, 
dizziness, and fatigue (202,234). No serious adverse events were 
found to be definitely related to the use of prescribed antimicrobials 
(202,234). Adverse events associated with ciprofloxacin or doxycy-
cline were not substantially different enough for one therapy to be 
recommended instead of the other (178,202). Among persons who 
began the 60-day PEP regimen, 21%–41% continued the regimen 
as prescribed (202). Adverse events were a commonly cited reason 
for discontinuation of antimicrobial PEP; 73 (78%) of the 93 
persons in the Washington, DC, postal center who stopped taking 
antimicrobial PEP cited adverse events as a reason for nonadher-
ence (235). Perceived risk for exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis 
was a statistically significant predictor of adherence to PEP (235), 
and according to one study, perceived risk was a stronger predictor 
of adherence than actual adverse events (202). 
Antimicrobial Considerations for Pregnant or 
Breastfeeding Women
Based on limited human clinical information, use of thera-
peutic doses of ciprofloxacin during pregnancy is unlikely to 
have a substantial teratogenic risk; however, the actual terato-
genic risk from ciprofloxacin use during pregnancy is unknown 
(13,236). Even with these limited data, ciprofloxacin is rec-
ommended as the first-line antimicrobial agent of choice for 
PEP for asymptomatic pregnant or lactating women because 
of the severity of inhalation anthrax (237). Treatment should 
be changed to amoxicillin if the strain of B. anthracis is found 
to be sufficiently susceptible to penicillin (237).
Potential risks associated with the use of tetracycline antimi-
crobials during pregnancy include dental staining of the fetal pri-
mary teeth and possible depressed fetal bone growth and dental 
enamel defects. Hepatic necrosis has been reported in pregnant 
women using tetracyclines, although such reports are rare (13). 
Tetracyclines should be used cautiously in asymptomatic preg-
nant women and only if contraindications to the use of other 
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appropriate antimicrobial agents exist. Penicillins are generally 
considered to be safe during pregnancy and are not associated 
with an increased risk for fetal malformation (238).
The American Academy of Pediatrics considers ciprofloxacin 
and tetracyclines (including doxycycline) to be appropriate for 
breastfeeding women because the amount of drug absorbed 
by infants is small; however, little is known about the safety 
of long-term use (239). Because of the severity of inhalation 
anthrax, ciprofloxacin and doxycycline are considered the first-
line antimicrobial agents of choice for PEP (237) as indicated 
for adults in these recommendations. Because amoxicillin is 
known to be safe for infants, this antimicrobial is an option for 
PEP for breastfeeding mothers when the appropriate condi-
tions described have been met and when the mother has no 
contraindications to amoxicillin. If an infant is exposed to B. 
anthracis and is receiving PEP, the antimicrobial regimen of the 
breastfeeding mother should be the same as that of the child, 
when possible, to minimize infant exposure to multiple drugs. 
If the drug used by the mother is contraindicated in her infant, 
the mother should express and discard her breast milk while 
being treated. Breastfeeding may resume after the mother com-
pletes the course of antimicrobial therapy (204,240,241). 
Antimicrobial Considerations for Children
Although antimicrobials such as ciprofloxacin or doxycy-
cline are typically not administered to children, the severity of 
anthrax is sufficient that treatment with these antimicrobials 
is warranted and recommended for children who have been 
exposed to aerosolized B. anthracis spores. Amoxicillin is pre-
ferred for antimicrobial PEP in children when susceptibility 
testing indicates that the B. anthracis isolate involved is suscep-
tible to penicillins (i.e., MIC ≤0.125 µg/mL for amoxicillin). In 
these instances, a transition from ciprofloxacin or doxycycline 
to amoxicillin is recommended for completion of the 60-day 
PEP antimicrobial regimen (Table 1).
TABLE 1. Recommended initial antimicrobial agent and anthrax vaccine adsorbed (AVA) dosages for postexposure prophylaxis 
(PEP) after exposure to aerosolized Bacillus anthracis spores 
Population Antimicrobials for 60-day* PEP AVA dosage and route† 
Adults (18–65 yrs) One of the following for 60 days:
Ciprofloxacin,§ 500 mg orally twice daily 
Doxycycline, 100 mg orally twice daily 
3-dose subcutaneous (SC) series: first dose administered 
as soon as possible, second and third doses administered 
2 and 4 wks after the first dose
Pregnant women¶ One of the following for 60 days:
Ciprofloxacin, 500 mg orally twice daily
Doxycycline, 100 mg orally twice daily
Amoxicillin,** 500 mg every 8 hrs
3-dose SC series; first dose administered as soon as pos-
sible, second and third doses administered 2 and 4 wks 
after the first dose
Children (<18 yrs)†† One of the following for 60 days:
Ciprofloxacin,§,††,§§ 15 mg/kg every 12 hrs 
Doxycycline,††,¶¶ (maximum of 100 mg/dose)
>8 yrs and >45 kg: 100 mg every 12 hrs 
>8 yrs and ≤45 kg: 2.2 mg/kg every 12 hrs 
≤8 yrs: 2.2 mg/kg every 12 hrs
Amoxicillin,**,*** 45 mg/kg/day orally divided into 3 daily doses 
given every 8 hrs; each dose should not exceed 500 mg
Recommendations for use of AVA in children are made on 
an event-by-event basis.
 * Antimicrobials should continue for 14 days after administration of the third dose of vaccine.
 † AVA used for PEP must be administered subcutaneously.
 § Levofloxacin is a second-line antimicrobial agent for PEP for persons aged ≥6 mos with medical issues (e.g., tolerance or resistance to ciprofloxacin) that 
indicate its use. Children: 16 mg/kg/day divided every 12 hrs; each dose should not exceed 250 mg. Adults: 500 mg every 24 hrs. Safety data on extended 
use of levofloxacin in any population for >28 days are limited; therefore, levofloxacin PEP should only be used when the benefit outweighs the risk.
 ¶ The antimicrobial of choice for initial prophylactic therapy among pregnant women is ciprofloxacin. Doxycycline should be used with caution in asymp-
tomatic pregnant women and only when other appropriate antimicrobial drugs are contraindicated. Although tetracyclines are not recommended during 
pregnancy, their use might be indicated for life-threatening illness. 
 ** If susceptibility testing demonstrates an amoxicillin MIC ≤0.125 µg/mL, oral amoxicillin should be used to complete therapy. 
 †† Use of tetracyclines and fluoroquinolones in children can have adverse effects. These effects must be weighed carefully against the risk for developing 
life-threatening disease. If exposure to B. anthracis is confirmed, children may be treated initially with ciprofloxacin or doxycycline as prophylaxis.  However, 
amoxicillin is preferred for antimicrobial PEP in children when susceptibility testing indicates that the B. anthracis isolate is susceptible to penicillins. 
 §§ Each ciprofloxacin dose should not exceed 500 mg, or 1 g/day.
 ¶¶ In 1991, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) amended the recommendation to allow treatment of young children with tetracyclines for serious 
infections such as Rocky Mountain spotted fever for which doxycycline might be indicated. Doxycycline is preferred for its twice daily dosage and low 
incidence of gastrointestinal side effects.
 *** Because of the lack of data on amoxicillin dosages for treating anthrax (and the associated high mortality rate), AAP recommends a higher dosage of 
80 mg/kg/day, divided into 3 daily doses; each dose should not exceed 500 mg. If this higher dosage of amoxicillin is used, recipients should be carefully 
monitored for side effects from long-term treatment.
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Antimicrobial Considerations for other 
Populations
For other specific populations, such as older adults or patients 
with certain underlying medical conditions (i.e., diabetes or 
renal failure), standard medical practice should be followed. 
Additional antimicrobial agents that are not FDA approved for 
treatment or prevention of anthrax but that may be considered 
include clindamycin, chloramphenicol, rifampin, vancomycin, 
and other fluoroquinolones. Health-care providers should 
consult with public health officials when choosing alternative 
antimicrobial agents and should consider the antimicrobial 
susceptibility of the associated strains of B. anthracis. 
Risk for Exposure to B. anthracis 
Anthrax exposure is categorized as non–bioterrorism 
related (i.e., naturally occurring) or bioterrorism related (i.e., 
intentional). Although naturally occurring anthrax decreased 
substantially in the United States beginning in 1957 after 
the initiation of animal vaccination with the Sterne vaccine, 
persons in certain occupations remain at higher risk for 
naturally occurring anthrax exposure. In contrast, the risk for 
bioterrorism-related anthrax is difficult to predict. 
General Public
Members of the general public, including pregnant or breast-
feeding women, are not at risk for exposure to naturally occurring 
anthrax but might be exposed through a bioterrorism event that 
would be time limited, sporadic, and most likely geographically 
limited, as well as difficult to predict, detect, or prevent (9). The 
target population for a bioterrorism-related release of B. anthracis 
cannot be predicted, and the risk for exposure cannot be reliably 
calculated. Once a bioterrorism event occurs, exposure and risk for 
disease development at the individual level are difficult to identify. 
No data suggest that the risk for developing anthrax is greater for 
pregnant women who have been exposed to B. anthracis than for 
nonpregnant women who have been exposed. Among children, 
naturally occurring cases and one confirmed case resulting from 
exposure during the 2001 bioterrorism events have been reported 
(43,242–244). Data are limited regarding the risk for developing 
anthrax in children after exposure; however, the risk is assumed 
to be similar to the risk for adults. Like the general public, medi-
cal personnel are not at risk for exposure to naturally occurring 
anthrax but might be exposed through a bioterrorism event. In 
general, the risk for acquiring anthrax when caring for infected or 
contaminated patients is thought to be negligible because no per-
son-to-person transmission or secondary cases of anthrax among 
medical personnel have been documented. Medical personnel are 
recommended to routinely follow infection control measures to 
minimize risk for known nosocomial infections (245). 
Populations at Risk for occupational 
Exposure
Persons who repeatedly enter potentially contaminated areas 
should use appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE), 
which is defined in this report as consisting of a powered air-
purifying respirator with full-facepiece and high-efficiency par-
ticulate air (HEPA) filters, disposable protective clothing with 
integral hood and booties, and disposable gloves (246). However, 
despite the use of appropriate PPE, exposures during repeated 
encounters with contaminated areas might occur because PPE 
is not 100% effective, individual work practices might lead to 
exposure, breaches in PPE and environmental controls might 
occur, and some breaches might not be detected (247,248). 
Persons Handling Animals or Animal 
Products 
Improvements in industrial hygiene standards, mechaniza-
tion of animal processing, animal disease control, and strict 
importation guidelines have reduced the risk for exposure to 
anthrax among manufacturing employees working with ani-
mals and animal products such as imported animal hides, furs, 
bone meal, wool, animal hair, or bristles (6,31).§ Nevertheless, 
slaughterhouse workers, butchers (249), and wool and mohair 
processors might still be at risk for exposure to B. anthracis 
spores if the industry standards are not upheld. 
Inhalation and cutaneous anthrax are occupational hazards 
primarily for workers who process hides, hair (especially from 
goats), bone and bone products, and wool (31,39,43) and 
for veterinary, agriculture, and wildlife workers who handle 
infected animals (48). Domestic exposure to B. anthracis spores 
might occur during contact with contaminated bone-meal 
fertilizer (40) or wool yarn (250), while making or playing 
contaminated goat-skin drums (37,38,44), and during contact 
with other domestic products (31,41). 
Occupational exposure to B. anthracis through contact with ani-
mals, whether in an agricultural or industrial setting, remains a risk 
when contact with animals with suspected or confirmed anthrax 
occurs. However, such human cases are rare (251), and cutaneous 
anthrax is the primary risk. Exposure to B. anthracis spores in soil 
is not considered a substantial risk for human inhalation anthrax 
because spores are bound to heavy soil particles (28). 
§ Sanitary control of animal byproducts (except casings), and hay and straw, 
offered for entry into the United States, 9 C.F.R. Pt. 95.
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 Persons Working in Laboratories 
Multiple types of laboratories might work with B. anthracis, 
including academic (research), military, veterinary, food-test-
ing, and public health laboratories. Direct and indirect contact 
with contaminated objects, accidental parenteral inoculation, 
and generation of aerosolized particles are all potential risks 
for infection. Certain activities increase the risk for exposure, 
such as working with large volumes and high concentrations 
of the organism or performing activities that might result in 
aerosolization, such as vortexing and centrifugation (252). In 
2006, the Association of Public Health Laboratories website 
provided guidance to address sample transport, receipt, and 
screening of unknown environmental samples (253).
Persons Working in Postal Facilities 
The distribution of letters laden with anthrax spores through 
the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) in 2001 established the mail as a 
feasible route of exposure. In the event of another attack through 
the mail, the risk for exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis spores is 
presumed to be high among staff members in a USPS processing 
and distribution center who work with mechanical processing 
equipment that might generate aerosol particles. In response, 
USPS implemented environmental monitoring to rapidly iden-
tify the presence of B. anthracis in these centers. Detection of 
B. anthracis using these validated USPS monitors would identify 
a likely exposure (D Sosin, CDC, personal communication, 
October 2, 2008) and allow prompt initiation of antimicrobial 
PEP while laboratory verification is being performed. 
Military Personnel 
The personnel who have been determined by DoD to be at 
risk for exposure to B. anthracis spores include military person-
nel being deployed to areas designated by DoD as posing a high 
risk for anthrax exposure, other select military units with unique 
missions, civilians deemed to be essential emergency personnel 
in designated locations, and contractors assigned to higher risk 
areas who are performing mission-essential services (254,255). 
Persons Involved in Emergency Response 
Activities
Environmental Investigators and Remediation 
Workers 
Conducting remediation of B. anthracis-contaminated areas 
can pose a risk for exposure to B. anthracis spores. Repeated 
occupational exposures might occur during environmental 
investigation or remediation efforts after identification of 
anthrax cases, regardless of whether the event is bioterrorism 
related. However, certain features of a bioterrorism event 
might result in higher risk for exposure during remediation 
activities. The characteristics of an intentionally dispersed strain 
of B. anthracis (e.g., antimicrobial resistance or dispersion 
capabilities) might differ from those of a naturally occurring 
strain. The level of environmental contamination resulting 
from intentionally dispersed strains, and therefore the potential 
for exposure at lower infective doses, might be significantly 
greater than the level of contamination that would result from 
naturally occurring strains. Because animal studies indicate 
that the incubation period for inhalation anthrax might be 
inversely related to the dose of B. anthracis spores (95,107,108), 
exposure to higher levels of spores may result in more rapid 
disease onset, with limited time for initiating PEP. 
Emergency and other Responders 
Persons involved in emergency response activities might 
include persons who work in police departments, fire depart-
ments, hazardous material units, and the National Guard, as 
well as other government responders. These persons might 
perform site investigations, respond to suspicious substance 
reports (also known as white powder incidents), and perform 
other related activities such as evacuation procedures or other 
activities critical to the maintenance of infrastructure. The risk 
for potential exposures associated with responder activities 
varies depending on the situation. Although the risk for expo-
sure to aerosolized B. anthracis spores is likely low, secondary 
aerosolization of previously settled spores might occur during 
the performance of certain activities (63). Because the location 
and dissemination of the organism as a result of a bioterrorism 
attack cannot be predicted, the risk for exposure to aerosolized 
B. anthracis spores in association with emergency response 
activities cannot be quantified.
Recommended Uses of 
Anthrax Vaccine 
AVA may be used 1) via the licensed schedule to prevent infec-
tion by priming the immune system before exposure to B. anthracis 
(pre-event or preexposure vaccination) and 2) after exposure to 
aerosolized B. anthracis spores under an IND or possibly under 
an EUA (PEP vaccination) (Tables 2 and 3). Recommendations 
for the use of AVA differ for pre-event or preexposure vaccination 
and postexposure vaccination. For pre-event or preexposure vac-
cination, ACIP recommends 5 IM doses administered at day 0, 
week 4, and months 6, 12, and 18, followed by annual boosters. 
To elicit the most substantial and rapid immune response pos-
sible among previously unvaccinated persons in a postexposure 
setting, PEP vaccination should be administered as a 3-dose SC 
series (at 0, 2, and 4 weeks) in conjunction with a 60-day course 
of appropriate antimicrobial agents. 
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Pre-event and Preexposure 
Vaccination
By priming the immune system before exposure to B. anthracis 
spores, pre-event and preexposure vaccination might provide 
more protection than antimicrobial agents alone to persons 
at risk for occupational exposure to B. anthracis, including 
protection for persons exposed to large inocula, protection 
if the public health infrastructure cannot ensure immediate 
availability or timely delivery of postevent antimicrobial agents, 
and potential benefits if bioengineered strains were released, 
limiting antimicrobial PEP effectiveness. The potential benefits 
from pre-event and preexposure vaccination should be weighed 
against the resource requirements to implement and maintain 
the vaccination schedule, as well as the potential adverse events 
associated with vaccination. Decisions for pre-event vaccina-
tion should be made based on a calculated risk assessment. In 
the absence of such an assessment, vaccination may be consid-
ered based on an estimated/presumed risk-benefit assessment. 
Depending on the occupational activities of the vaccine recipi-
ent, pre-event or preexposure vaccination might not eliminate 
the need for appropriate personal protective equipment. 
General Public
Because the location and timing of a bioterrorism attack 
cannot be predicted, the risk-benefit profile for pre-event vac-
cination for the general public is low, and pre-event vaccination 
is not recommended. Preventing the morbidity and mortality 
associated with a deliberate release of B. anthracis depends on 
public vigilance, early detection and diagnosis, appropriate 
treatment, and rapid administration of PEP.
Special Populations
Pregnant and Breastfeeding Women
In a pre-event setting, in which the risk for exposure to aerosolized 
B. anthracis spores is presumably low, vaccination of pregnant 
women is not recommended and should be deferred until after 
pregnancy. Breastfeeding is neither a precaution nor a contraindica-
tion to vaccination, and vaccination does not need to be deferred 
in a pre-event setting if the occupation of the breastfeeding mother 
poses a risk for exposure to B. anthracis. 
Children
In a pre-event setting, in which the risk for exposure to 
aerosolized B. anthracis spores is presumably low, vaccination 
of children is not recommended.
Medical Personnel
 Pre-event vaccination is not recommended for medical 
personnel. If exposed to aerosolized B. anthracis spores during 
a bioterrorism event, they should receive PEP in accordance 
with ACIP recommendations.
Populations at Risk for occupational 
Exposure
Persons Handling Animals or Animal Products 
Routine preexposure vaccination for persons who handle 
animals or animal products is recommended only for persons 
for whom previously discussed standards and restrictions 
are insufficient to prevent exposure to B. anthracis spores. 
Preexposure vaccination is not recommended for persons who 
routinely have contact with animal hide drums or animal hides; 
other preventive measures are available. 
Routine vaccination of U.S. veterinarians and animal hus-
bandry technicians is not recommended because of the low 
incidence of animal anthrax cases in the United States. However, 
vaccination might be recommended for veterinarians and other 
persons considered to be at high risk for anthrax exposure if they 
handle potentially infected animals in research settings or in areas 
with a high incidence of enzootic anthrax cases. 
Laboratorians
Preexposure vaccination is recommended for laboratorians at 
risk for repeated exposure to fully virulent B. anthracis spores, 
such as those who 1) work with high concentrations of spores 
with potential for aerosol production; 2) handle environmental 
samples that might contain powders and are associated with 
anthrax investigations; 3) routinely work with pure cultures of 
B. anthracis; 4) frequently work in spore-contaminated areas 
after a bioterrorism attack; or 5) work in other settings where 
repeated exposures to B. anthracis aerosols may occur.
TABLE 2. Recommended preexposure and postexposure vaccination schedules for anthrax vaccine adsorbed
Type of prophylaxis Schedule Route Dose 
Preexposure 5 doses (0 wks, 4 wks, 6 mos, 12 mos, and 18 mos)
Annual booster to maintain immunity 
Intramuscular 0.5 mL 
Postexposure* 3 doses (0, 2, and 4 wks)†,§ Subcutaneous 0.5 mL 
* For previously unvaccinated persons.
† In conjunction with 60-day antimicrobial postexposure prophylaxis.
§ Administered under an Investigational New Drug (IND) protocol or an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA).
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Persons Working in Postal Processing Facilities
Because of biodetection systems in postal processing centers, 
contamination of mail with B. anthracis spores is likely to be 
detected rapidly, allowing postexposure therapy to be initiated 
immediately. Therefore, persons who work in these facilities 
are not recommended to receive pre-event vaccination. 
Military Personnel
Military personnel determined by DoD to have a calcu-
lable risk for exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis spores are 
recommended to receive preexposure vaccination. DoD has 
exclusionary criteria for employees, including an exclusion for 
pre-event vaccination of pregnant women (256,257). 
Environmental Investigators and Remediation 
Workers
Vaccination is recommended for persons who, as part of 
their occupation, might repeatedly enter areas contaminated 
with B. anthracis spores. 
Emergency and other Responders
Emergency and other responders are not recommended to 
receive routine pre-event anthrax vaccination because of the 
lack of a calculable risk assessment. However, responder units 
engaged in response activities that might lead to exposure to 
aerosolized B. anthracis spores may offer their workers volun-
tary pre-event vaccination. The vaccination program should 
be carried out under the direction of a comprehensive occu-
pational health and safety program. 
Delayed Doses 
Available data on AVA dosages suggest that increasing the 
interval between doses does not decrease the ultimate sero-
logic response achieved or adversely affect the safety profile. 
Therefore, as with other vaccines, interruption of the vaccina-
tion schedule does not require restarting the entire series or 
the addition of extra doses (199).
PEP
PEP should be used for previously unvaccinated persons 
after exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis spores, whether the 
TABLE 3. Recommendations for use of anthrax vaccine adsorbed, by type of population
Population Pre-event* Postexposure prophylaxis (PEP)†
General public Not recommended Recommended
Special populations in the general public
Pregnant women Not recommended Recommended
Breastfeeding women Not recommended Recommended
Children (aged <18 yrs) Not recommended Determined on an event-by-event basis
Medical professionals Not recommended Recommended
Populations at risk for occupational exposure
Persons who handle animals or animal products Not routinely recommended§ Recommended
Persons who perform certain types of laboratory 
work
Recommended¶ Based on pre-event vaccination status
Persons who work in postal facilities Not recommended Recommended
Military personnel As recommended by the Department of Defense As recommended by the Department of 
Defense
Persons involved in environmental investigations 
or remediation efforts
Recommended Based on pre-event vaccination status 
Persons involved in emergency response 
activities** 
Not routinely recommended; may be offered on a 
voluntary basis under the direction of a comprehen-
sive occupational health and safety program
Recommended 
 * Five 0.5-mL doses administered intramuscularly at 0 wks, 4 wks, 6 mos, 12 mos, and 18 mos; annual boosters are required to maintain immunity.
 † Three 0.5-mL doses administered subcutaneously at 0, 2, and 4 wks after exposure to aerosolized Bacillus anthracis spores for persons who have not 
completed the pre-event vaccination schedule.
 § Recommended only if handling potentially infected animals in research settings or in areas with a high incidence of enzootic anthrax or when standards 
and restrictions are insufficient to prevent exposure to B. anthracis spores. 
 ¶ Laboratorians who work 1) with high concentrations or pure cultures of B. anthracis spores, 2) with environmental samples associated with anthrax 
investigations, or 3) in spore-contaminated areas or other settings with exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis spores. Laboratorians who do not work in 
these settings are not recommended for pre-event vaccine.
 ** Persons involved in emergency response activities might include persons who work in police departments, fire departments, hazardous material units, and the 
National Guard, as well as other government responders. These persons might perform site investigations, respond to suspicious substance reports (also known 
as white powder incidents), and perform other related activities, such as evacuation procedures or other activities critical to the maintenance of infrastructure.
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exposure is naturally occurring, occupationally related, or 
intentional. To elicit the most substantial and rapid immune 
response possible for previously unvaccinated persons in a 
postexposure setting, vaccination should be administered as 
recommended in conjunction with appropriate antimicrobial 
agents (Tables 1  and 2). 
PEP After Inhalation Exposure 
General Adult Population 
ACIP recommends a postexposure regimen of 60 days of 
appropriate antimicrobial prophylaxis combined with 3 SC 
doses of AVA (administered at 0, 2, and 4 weeks postexposure) 
as the most effective protection against inhalation anthrax for 
previously unvaccinated persons aged ≥18 years who have been 
exposed to aerosolized B. anthracis spores. 
After exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis spores, antimicro-
bial therapy should be initiated as soon as possible. Ideally, the 
first dose of vaccine should be administered within 10 days. 
Because AVA is not licensed for postexposure use, the vaccine 
will likely be made available either through an IND or an EUA 
during a public health emergency. 
In general, the peak serologic response to anthrax vaccine 
occurs 10–14 days after the third dose. To ensure continued 
protection, persons for whom vaccination has been delayed 
should extend antimicrobial use to 14 days after the third dose, 
even though this practice might result in use of antimicrobials 
for >60 days. Antimicrobials should not be used for <60 days 
in previously unvaccinated persons who have been exposed to 
aerosolized B. anthracis spores.
Pregnant Women
In a postevent setting that poses a high risk for exposure to 
aerosolized B. anthracis spores, pregnancy is neither a precau-
tion nor a contraindication to PEP. Pregnant women at risk 
for inhalation anthrax should receive AVA and 60 days of 
antimicrobial therapy as described.
Breastfeeding Women 
In a postevent setting that poses a high risk for exposure to 
aerosolized B. anthracis spores, breastfeeding remains neither a 
precaution nor a contraindication to PEP. Breastfeeding women 
at risk for inhalation anthrax should receive AVA and 60 days 
of antimicrobial therapy as described. 
Children
The use of AVA in children is not contraindicated in a 
postevent setting that poses a high risk for exposure to aero-
solized B. anthracis spores. During such an event, public health 
authorities will determine whether, under the existing IND 
protocol, to offer vaccine to children aged 0–17 years. Under 
this IND protocol, 3 doses of vaccine would be administered 
in conjunction with 60 days of appropriate antimicrobial 
therapy. 
PEP After Repeated occupational Exposures 
The combination of pre-event vaccine and appropriate PPE 
effectively protects fully vaccinated persons who work in occu-
pations that might result in repeated exposure to aerosolized 
B. anthracis spores (Table 4). Antimicrobial PEP is not needed 
for fully vaccinated workers who wear appropriate PPE while 
working in environments contaminated with B. anthracis spores 
unless the PPE is disrupted. However, fully vaccinated workers 
who prefer additional protection may consider antimicrobial 
PEP under the direction of their occupational health program
A 30-day course of antimicrobial PEP is recommended for 
partially vaccinated workers (Table 4), fully vaccinated work-
ers who do not wear PPE, and fully vaccinated workers whose 
PPE has been disrupted; these workers should continue with 
their licensed vaccination regimen.
TABLE 4. Postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) for persons with repeated occupational exposures to aerosolized Bacillus anthracis 
spores, by preexposure anthrax vaccine adsorbed vaccination status
Vaccination status Vaccination recommendation Duration of antimicrobial PEP*
No previous vaccine Use PEP schedule of 3 subcutaneous doses 
(0, 2, and 4, wks); resume the licensed vac-
cination schedule† at 6 mos
60 days; continue for 14 days after the third dose of vac-
cine, even if initial vaccine administration is delayed and 
therefore antimicrobial is used for >60 days 
Partially vaccinated§ Continue with licensed vaccination schedule† At least 30 days after any type of disruption of respiratory 
protection¶
Fully vaccinated** Continue with annual boosters as scheduled At least 30 days after any type of disruption of respiratory 
protection¶
 * Because antimicrobial PEP is the primary intervention, do not delay initiation if vaccine is not available.
 † Licensed vaccination schedule: 5 doses intramuscularly (IM) (0 wks, 4 wks, 6 mos, 12 mos, and 18 mos), with annual boosters thereafter.
 § Partially vaccinated persons have either received <5 IM priming doses or have not received all annual boosters indicated by the licensed vaccination schedule. 
 ¶ Because respiratory protection can be disrupted in numerous ways (e.g., a face-seal leak in a respirator or not wearing personal protective equipment 
when entering an area presumed to be uncontaminated that is later determined to be contaminated) and such disruptions are not always detected, the 
threshold for assuming such a disruption has occurred should be extremely low.
 ** Fully vaccinated workers have completed the 5-dose IM series and have received all annual booster doses indicated by the licensed vaccination schedule.
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A 60-day course of antimicrobial PEP is recommended for 
previously unvaccinated workers. These workers also should 
begin receiving AVA as soon as possible using the PEP schedule 
of 3 SC doses. 
PEP After naturally occurring Cutaneous or 
Gastrointestinal Exposure 
Vaccination is not recommended after cutaneous or gastro-
intestinal exposures that pose no risk for inhalation exposure. 
When a naturally occurring cutaneous exposure occurs, appro-
priate medical and public health personnel should be notified, 
and affected persons should be monitored for development of a 
spot, pimple, or boil-like lesion, especially in the exposed areas. 
For persons who experience a naturally occurring gastrointes-
tinal exposure, such those who eat meat from an undercooked 
carcass of an anthrax-infected animal, antimicrobial PEP for 
7–14 days may be considered. 
Contraindication and Precautions for 
Use of AVA 
The following contraindication and precautions are relevant 
for both preexposure and postexposure settings (137).
Contraindication
Although anaphylaxis after anthrax vaccination is extremely 
rare and no anaphylaxis deaths associated with AVA have been 
reported (CDC, unpublished data, 2010), an anaphylactic 
reaction can be life-threatening. Therefore, AVA is contrain-
dicated for persons who have experienced an anaphylactic 
reaction after a previous dose of AVA or any of the vaccine 
components.
Precautions
Latex allergy:•  Because the vaccine vial stopper 
contains dry, natural rubber, caution should be used 
when administering the vaccine to persons with a latex 
allergy (137). Epinephrine solution (1:1000) should 
be available for immediate use in the event that an 
anaphylactic reaction occurs. 
History of anthrax disease:•  A history of anthrax 
disease might increase the potential for severe local 
adverse reactions after AVA administration (137). 
Impaired immune response:•  Patients with an 
impaired immune response might not be adequately 
immunized after administration of AVA (137). 
Moderate or severe acute illness:•  In a standard preex-
posure vaccination program, vaccination of persons with 
moderate or severe acute illness should be postponed 
until after recovery (137). In a postevent setting, the 
risks of administering vaccine to a person who has been 
exposed to anthrax but has moderate or severe acute 
illness should be weighed against the benefits of vaccina-
tion. Vaccine may be administered to persons who have 
a mild illness with or without a low-grade fever. 
Reporting Adverse Events
Adverse events that occur after administration of anthrax vaccine 
should be reported to VAERS, regardless of whether the reporter 
considers the vaccine to be the cause of the event. Information 
about VAERS and how to report vaccine adverse events is available 
at http://vaers.hhs.gov. Adverse events that occur after adminis-
tration of antimicrobial agents should be reported to the FDA 
MedWatch program at http://www.fda.gov/medwatch.
Current and Future Research 
Research priorities for future studies on the currently licensed 
anthrax vaccine should include immunogenicity; additional 
evaluations of the dosing schedule (including the maximum time 
between boosters); additional long-term human safety studies; the 
number of vaccine doses required for PEP; the optimal duration 
of antimicrobial use in postexposure settings; antimicrobial sus-
ceptibility and treatment studies; optimal alternative antimicrobial 
agents for children, older adults (aged >65 years), and pregnant 
women; and the safety of anthrax vaccine in clinical toxicology 
studies among pregnant animals. Future research should include 
the groups for whom AVA is currently licensed, as well as children, 
older adults, and pregnant women. These research questions also 
should be addressed as new potential anthrax vaccines are identi-
fied and considered for use in humans.
Research on AVA and Future Anthrax 
Vaccines: Immunogenicity, Schedule, 
and Route 
Research is ongoing to address priority topics, including 
identification of quantitative immune correlates of protection 
in relevant animal species and defining the quantitative rela-
tionship between the vaccine-elicited immune response in these 
animal species and humans. Completion of the ongoing AVRP 
clinical trial should provide a definitive clinical evaluation of 
the effects of reducing the number of AVA doses (140). 
Information regarding the efficacy and safety of AVA in 
children and older adults also is needed, as is additional infor-
mation regarding the safety and efficacy of AVA when used 
during pregnancy. Future research should include trials to 
obtain this information and to develop dosage recommenda-
tions for children. In addition, research to further develop both 
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the recombinant PA (rPA) vaccines and the next generation of 
anthrax vaccines should continue. 
Postexposure Prophylaxis 
Studies in animals indicate that the combination of antimi-
crobials and vaccination is very effective for preventing systemic 
B. anthracis infection. When using a combined approach the 
immune system benefits from the acute-phase antimicrobial 
protection provided against germinating spores and vegetative 
cells of B. anthracis while gaining enough time to complete 
immunological priming and establish anamnestic capability 
(i.e., immunological memory) (93). The effectiveness of vac-
cination might allow the antimicrobial course to be shortened 
from the recommended 60 days to as few as 14 days (102). 
Definitive, pivotal human studies to evaluate the magnitude 
and duration of the human immune response to anthrax vac-
cines when combined with antimicrobials have not been con-
ducted. Additional research is needed to determine the optimal 
duration of antimicrobial administration in conjunction with 
the optimal doses of vaccine. 
Long-term Safety of AVA 
The FDA final order for use of AVA emphasizes the need to 
continue postmarketing safety studies (135), and the IOM reports 
document the need for additional long-term follow-up of vac-
cine recipients (152,169). VAU continues to conduct research to 
address these issues through a combination of studies, including 
continued screening of the VAERS database for identification of 
potential long-term adverse events, hypothesis testing research 
studies using the DMSS database (170), and assessments of new 
safety signals identified from VAERS or other sources. 
Alternative Anthrax Vaccines
The rPA vaccines contain the purified protein of an avirulent, 
non–spore-forming strain of B. anthracis (258). Although 
recent phase 1 dose-escalation studies comparing rPA with 
AVA for reactogenicity, immunogenicity, and dosing range of 
rPA have been conducted (258,259), problems with vaccine 
formulation have delayed the start of phase 3 trials. One for-
mulation demonstrated that immune responses of participants 
receiving rPA with adjuvant were not statistically significantly 
different from the responses of those receiving AVA (258). 
Evidence indicates that rPA candidate vaccines might cause 
fewer local adverse events than AVA administered subcutane-
ously (259). However, licensure of new anthrax vaccine will 
likely not occur for several years.
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